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PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES
I. Introduction
All governments need money in order to pay for operations, and
they obtain funds through a number of means. Emerging economies are
in a unique, perhaps enviable position because they have not built up
large, burdensome tax collecting bureaucracies.' The tax systems in
Western democracies, on the other hand, have become increasingly
complex, inefficient, and difficult to manage. For example, tax laws in
the United States are passed, later amended, and then amended again.
Tax laws often become obscure because the government continually
passes new, complex laws.2 Since laws are easier to pass than to repeal,
the volume and complexity of these laws grow each year to the point
where the whole tax system is in danger of collapsing on itself.
Emerging economies do not face these problems. They do not have
to dismantle old systems of taxation before constructing new systems, but
can instead start without the burden of complex, inefficient, and obscure
tax laws. They have the opportunity to study existing tax systems,
selecting methods that work and disregarding methods that do not. They
can learn from the mistakes of Western democracies and can construct
tax systems that are simple, efficient, and more equitable.3
Constructing a tax system involves more than simply economic
engineering, but also involves the development and implementation of
philosophical positions. For instance, one revenue raising method may
be "better" than another, but not "fairer." When speaking of "better"
or "fairer" tax systems, one leaves the realm of value-free economic
analysis and enters the realm of philosophy because value judgments are
required to answer questions involving these terms.'
I. See Emese P. Flyn6, Structural Changes in Eastern European Countries -- Case of
Hungary, 33 ARTHA VINANA 345, 345 (1991). These countries have built up other systems,
however, that require structural changes. Id.
2. This obscurity occurs in many of the tax laws in the United States and other Western
democracies. I will say more about this point later.
3. It can be argued that no public finance system based on coercion can be completely
equitable because such systems take property without the owners' consent.
4. Commentatorsover the years have debated whether economics is a value-free science. See
LUDWIG VON MIsEs, HUMAN AcTION 882-85 (1966). If one's goal is simply to go from point A
to point B, a policy is good if it achieves the goal and bad if it does not. However, simply because
an economist states that a policy is good or bad does not mean that the economist forms a value
judgment. Instead, the economist only considers whether or not the policy measures up to its stated
goal. Value judgments arise only when one asks whether the policy's goal is worthy in the first
place. At this point, the discussion leaves the realm of economics and enters the realm of
philosophy.
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Moreover, in developing systems of revenue collection, one
necessarily utilizes methods that involve more than common notions of
taxation. In a sense, all taxation is coercive-some would say
theft'-because it involves the taking of property without an owner's
consent.6 Not all methods of raising revenue, however, are coercive.
User fees and lotteries,7 for example, provide governments with a
noncoercive means for collecting revenue. These forms are not taxes in
a strict sense because they voluntarily transfer funds from individuals to
government.
This Article will review tax systems now being used in Western
democracies, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses in an attempt to
determine the type of tax system that an emerging economy should
adopt. This Article does not apply particular systems of taxation to
particular emerging economies, but rather recommends systems and
principles that all emerging economies can follow when creating a system
of revenue collection. Indeed, many of the developed Western countries
could beneficially apply the principles developed here, although they
would have difficulty doing so because of the entrenched bureaucracies
they have built up over the years. Part II of this Article examines
attributes common to the means governments utilize to raise revenue,
identifying the attributes that are desirable and those that are not. Part
III evaluates the major forms of raising revenue, setting forth the
advantages and disadvantages inherent in each form. Part IV discusses
the need to limit taxation and government spending and examines
methods lawmakers can utilize to limit government taxation. Finally,
Part V suggests basic principles of taxation upon which an emerging
economy can base its system of revenue collection.
II. Attributes of Taxation
Forms of taxation-more properly, systems of public finance-can
have many attributes. Tax systems may be based on coercion or
voluntary exchange. They may charge high or low rates. They may be
based on the ability to pay principle or the cost-benefit principle. Rates
may be uniform-the same rate for everyone-or discriminatory. The
5. J.R. Kearl, Do Entitlements Imply That Taxation Is Theft?, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 74,74-81
(1977).
6. If taxation is theft, one might legitimately ask whether tax evasion is unethical. Pope John
Paul II has stated that tax evasion is a sin, but others disagree. If tax evasion is ethical, should we
punish attorneys and accountants who advocate tax evasion because they encourage an action that
is ethical? See Robert W. McGee, Is Tax Evasion Unethical, KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming).
7. See infra pp. 83-84.
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system may be easy or difficult to administer. Taxes may be hidden or
visible. Taxes may be easy or difficult to collect. Collections may go
into a general fund, or may be earmarked for specific uses. Collections
may produce a steady cash flow or a sporadic, unpredictable cash flow.
The system chosen may produce minor or major distortions to the
economy. The system chosen will inevitably affect competitiveness and
economic growth. Rules may be simple or complex, clear or vague.
They may be stable over time, or may change frequently. The tax base
chosen may be wide or narrow. The system may result in major or
minor effects on behavior and incentives and social harmony. The
system may have high or low administrative costs. Finally, the revenue
raised from a specific tax may at times amount to less than the
administrative costs of collection.
These attributes are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they coexist in
the tax systems of all Western democracies. This section discusses these
attributes, attempting at times to determine the attributes that are
desirable and those that are undesirable.
A. Voluntary or Coercive
One goal in a liberal democracy' is to maximize individual liberty
and minimize the amount of state encroachment on that liberty. One can
apply this philosophy to the means governments use to raise revenue. A
government can raise revenue either through coercion, or through
voluntary exchange. Income,9 property, 10 and estate and gift taxes,"
8. In the United States, one defines the term "liberal" quite differently from how one defines
the term in Europe. In the United States, one might loosely define a liberal as someone who wants
government to interfere with the economy, but not with personal issues. In contrast, conservatives
want government to regulate personal conduct, but not the economy. Authoritarians want
government to regulate both the economy and personal conduct. On the other hand, libertarians do
not want government to regulate anything. Libertarians want to limit government action to the
defense of life, liberty, and property. Liberals advocate protectionism, tariffs, quotas, and wage and
price controls. Conservatives are against these policies. Liberals would repeal sex legislation for
consenting adults, while conservatives would advocate laws prohibiting homosexual conduct, nude
dancing, and so forth. For more on the classification of the political spectrum, contact Advocates
for Self-Government, Inc., 5533 East Swift, Fresno, CA 93727.
Thomas Jefferson, in his first inaugural address, gave perhaps the best definition of liberal
democracy in the European and nineteenth century American sense of the term. See THE WORLD'S
GREAT SPEECHES 259 (Lewis Copeland ed., 1942). He defined a liberal government as "a wise and
frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise
free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth
of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government." Id. at 261.
9. See infra pp. 64-69.
10. See infra pp. 69-70.
11. See infra pp. 78-79.
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for example, are coercive forms of taxation because individuals cannot
choose whether or not to pay. They must pay or face possible
punishment. Voluntary forms of revenue raising include lotteries and
user fees.'2 In these forms, the element of coercion is absent.
Some would argue that taxation is not really coercive, reasoning that
at some point, voters consented to be taxed. A number of flaws,
however, exist in this line of reasoning. First, the voters who consented
to be taxed did so in the past. With individual income taxes in the
United States, for example, they gave their consent in 1913. 3 Many
of the people who gave consent are now deceased, and others who were
alive and of voting age at that time did not give their consent.
Second, it is a fundamental principle of both common law and basic
justice that one person cannot be held for the contract of another.
Accordingly, even if one views consenting to be taxed as a contract
between citizens and the state, this contract is null and void in regard to
those who did not consent. Taxation is not noncoercive simply because
some voters agreed to be taxed in the past. Thomas Jefferson, in a letter
to John Wayles Eppes, elaborated on this point when he wrote, "We may
consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a right, by the will of
its majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding
generation, more than the inhabitants of another country." 4 In a letter
to James Madison, Jefferson went further, stating:
The question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind
another, seems never to have been started either on this or our side
of the water. Yet it is a question of such consequences as not only
to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental principles
of every government . . . no such obligation can be transmitted...
the earth belongs ... to the living .... 11
Jefferson determined the average life expectancy in his time to be
fifty-five years of age.' 6 He reasoned that, because the majority of
twenty-one year-olds who belonged to a particular generation would be
dead nineteen years after entering into a social contract with the state, the
12. See infra pp. 83-84.
13. In 1913, Congress passed the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See U.S.
CONsT. amend. XVI. This Amendment made income taxation constitutional. See id. Before that
time, the government raised needed money through excise taxes and tariffs.
14. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes (June 24, 1813), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRMNGS 1280, 1280-81 (1984).
15. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1878), in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRmNGS 959, 959 (1984).
16. Id. at 960.
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contract became null and void after nineteen years." This rule applied
to constitutions, public debt, and all laws. Every law and constitution
expired naturally at the end of that time. Accordingly, a government
enforcing a law or constitution beyond nineteen years did so by force,
not by right. 8  Following this line of reasoning, one could
philosophically argue that laws passed by majorities-or even by
unanimous vote-expire after some period of time because one generation
cannot bind another.
Another problem regarding the obligation of citizens to the state
involves the concept of majoritarianism. Under majoritarianism, if 51 %
of a population vote in a law, the other 49 % must obey the law whether
or not they want to do so. Although a basic weakness of democracy,
majoritarianism is endured so that democracy can function.' 9 It is a
pragmatic compromise. If unanimous consent were required for all laws,
governments would not be able to pass laws. Simply because a majority
passes a law, however, does not mean that the law is noncoercive. In
many instances, a large minority disapproves of the law. Furthermore,
in representational rather than direct democracies, representatives
sometimes pass a law not supported by the majority of citizens. Thus,
government is force, regardless of how many individuals voted in favor
of a particular law.'
Majoritarianism is also associated with the concept of a social
contract, the view that a group of people have somehow entered into a
contract with the state and that they can bind the entire population.2'
The population gives up a part of its freedom in exchange for certain
benefits that the state can provide.' Some social contract theorists,
such as Hobbes, would argue that individuals give up all their rights in
exchange for protection from the state.' Others, such as Locke, would
17. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes, supra note 14, at 1281.
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 15, at 962-63.
19. ThomasJefferson, in his first inaugural address, made the following point: "[Though the
will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the
minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect, and to violate which would be
oppression." THE WORLD'S GREAT SPEEcHEs, supra note 8, at 260.
20. * An advantage of democracy over dictatorship is that, under a dictatorship, one person
tyrannizes the other 99.99% of a country's population, while under a democracy, at worst, 51%
tyrannize the other 49% of a country's population. See HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 189
(1970). Others might characterize the difference between democracy and dictatorship as the number
of feet on one's throat.
21. See JEAN JAQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston trans., 1972).
22. Id.
23. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakshott ed., 1962).
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argue that individuals give up only some of their rights, and that the
individual can reclaim these rights if the state fails to do its job.24
Some commentators would go further asserting that social contracts
do not exist, and even if they did, they would not bind anyone who did
not agree to their terms. For example, Spooner states that
[t]he Constitution has no inherent authority or obligation. It has no
authority or obligation at all, unless as a contract between man and
man. And it does not so much as even purport to be a contract
between persons now existing. It purports, at most, to be only a
contract between persons living eighty years ago. And it can be
supposed to have been a contract then only between persons who had
already come to years of discretion, so as to be competent to make
reasonable and obligatory contracts. Furthermore, we know,
historically, that only a small portion even of the people then existing
were consulted on the subject, or asked, or permitted to express
either their consent or dissent in any formal manner. Those persons,
if any, who did give their consent formally, are all dead now. Most
of them have been dead forty, fifty, sixty or seventy years. And the
Constitution, so far as it was their contract, died with them. They
had no natural power or right to make it obligatory upon their
children. It is not only plainly impossible, in the nature of things,
that they could bind their posterity, but they did not even attempt to
bind them. That is to say, the instrument does not purport to be an
agreement between any body but "the people" then existing; nor does
it, either expressly or impliedly, assert any right, power, or
disposition, on their part, to bind anybody but themselves.2
Thus, those arguing that taxation is not coercive because "the people"
consented to it stand on shaky ground philosophically. Taxation is
coercive whenever it takes people's property without obtaining their
explicit consent.
Some arguing in favor of coercive forms of taxation assert that a
government cannot raise the funds it needs through voluntary means.
They contend that coercion is necessary for the state to function. While
impossible to fully explore this issue within the confines of this Article,
a few points should be raised. First, this line of reasoning is pragmatic
24. SeeJOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988).
The United States Declaration of Independence reflects Locke's view that people can replace a
government that fails to protect basic rights with one that protects these rights. See THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
25. LYSANDER SPOONER, No TREASON: THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY 11 (Ralph
Myles ed., 2d ed. 1980). Spooner refers to the U.S. Constitution, which was adopted approximately
eighty years before he wrote this essay. See U.S. CONST.
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rather than philosophical or ethical. It basically states that government
must use coercion simply because it is the only way to raise needed
funds. It does not address considerations of fairness, equity, and
property rights.
Moreover, even if one concedes that governments require some
level of coercion to raise funds, governments should minimize the
amount of coercion utilized. In a free society that attempts to maximize
individual choice, lawmakers should reduce coercive taxation wherever
possible. For example, lawmakers can reduce the role of government in
society by allowing the private sector to perform many of the tasks
carried out by government.26 A government that provides less services
needs less revenue to operate. While minimizing the role and size of
government is a worthy goal, accomplishing this goal is far from easy.
Despite the size of government, the tax system can be used to reduce
coercion if voluntary means of raising revenue are used first and coercive
methods are only used to satisfy revenue shortages.
Therefore, in a society that values freedom and private property,
voluntary forms of revenue raising are superior to coercive forms. If
one views government as the people's servant rather than master,
lawmakers must minimize coercion and maximize voluntary exchange.
Accordingly, forms of revenue raising that do not depend ofi coercion
are preferable to forms of revenue raising that rely on coercion. Where
government must provide services, it should first attempt to raise revenue
using noncoercive methods. Only where noncoercive means fail to
collect adequate revenue should governments employ coercive methods
of taxation. Moreover, tax laws that expire after some period of time
are preferable to tax laws that remain on the books until repealed.
Approval for any law declines with time as a portion of the citizenry dies
and new citizens are born. While this requirement would not solve the
consent problem completely, it would at least be a move in the right
direction.
B. High or Low Rates
A tax system may impose high or low tax rates. High tax rates are
a major disincentive to production, savings, and wealth accumulation.
For example, a painter in the 90% tax bracket27 offered a commission
26. The private sector can perform most governmental functions more efficiently and with less
cost, as numerous studies have shown. See JAMES T. BENNETr & MANUEL H. JOHNSON, BETTER
GOVERNMENT AT HALF THE PRICE (1981); RANDALL FITZGERALD, WHEN GOVERNMENT GOES
PRIVATE (1988); ROBERT W. POOLE, JR., CUTTING BACK CITY HALL (1980).
27. Marginal tax rates in the United States and countries such as England have reached 90%
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to paint a portrait for $20,000 only keeps $2,000 if she accepts the work.
In effect, she has the option of working for below market price or not
working at all.28 In this situation, she will often decide not to work,
and no one will ever paint the portrait. On the other hand, if she paints
the portrait, she may not declare the income on the commission. In this
situation, the high tax rate increases the amount of tax evasion in the
economy and decreases respect for the law.'
High tax rates affect many areas in an economy. For example, high
rates in the area of estate taxes discourage savings and investment.
When government confiscates 90% of one's assets at death, one has
incentive to immediately spend income when earned, rather than leaving
it for heirs. As a result, capital accumulation and, consequently,
economic growth and the standard of living decline. Of course, one can
give income and assets to children and grandchildren before death.
However, this option is not attractive when the government takes a large
portion of the gift through a gift tax.
A number of studies have concluded that, while high tax rates retard
economic growth, low rates encourage it. 3° When government takes
money out of the private sector, individuals cannot invest in business
expansion, cannot save, and cannot spend on consumption items.
Raising tixes simply redistributes previously created wealth. Thus, if
one desires to maximize economic growth, one must, among other
things, minimize taxes through lower tax rates.
A relationship also exists between economic efficiency and the tax
rate. When rates are high, businesses lose less from a bad investment
or more at times. In some instances, rates have exceeded 100%. For example, an individual in the
93 % bracket pays more than 100% in taxes when a government assesses a 10% surcharge.
28. MARK SKOUSEN, ECONOMICS ON TRIAL 159 (1991).
29. The subject of tax evasion presents interesting ethical and philosophical questions. If
taxation is theft, no ethical duty exists to pay taxes in the same way no ethical duty exists to turn
over your property to a thief. Taxation is similar to theft because in both cases someone takes an
individual's property without consent. However, differences between the two exist. With theft, a
robber only steals from an individual once. With taxation, the government continually takes an
individual's property. Moreover, taxation is arguably more akin to slavery because govemmentlives
off the fruit of an individual's continual labor.
The Roman Catholic Church recently issued its first new catechism since 1566. See Sins,
Ancient and Modern, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 1992, at 50; New Rules for an Old Faith, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 30, 1992, at 71. This catechism lists tax evasion as a sin. Nevertheless, theologians over the
centuries have repeatedly said that, at least in some situations, no moral duty exists to pay taxes.
See REV. MARTIN T. CROWE, THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF PAYING JUST TAXES (Catholic
University of America Studies in Sacred Theology, No. 84 (1944)) (representing one of the most
comprehensive treatises on the ethics of tax evasion).
30. Alan Reynolds, International Comparisons of Taxes and Government Spending, in RATING
GLOBAL ECONOMIC FREEDOM 366, 366 (Stephen T. Easton and Michael A. Walker eds., 1992).
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decision because they can deduct the loss on their tax return. As a
result, businesses tend to be less careful about making investments.
Furthermore, when high rates combine with a complex tax system, as
occurred in the United States before the enactment of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, 3 tax shelters-investments that make no economic sense,
but good tax sense-become more prevalent. For example, under a tax
shelter scheme that has a 5-to-i write-off, every $100 investment results
in a $500 tax deduction. If the tax rate is 50%, an investor can reduce
his taxes by $250 (50% of $500). Consequently, the initial loss
ultimately results in a return larger than returns attainable from most
legitimate investments that create real economic wealth.
While taxpayers prefer low rates, governments prefer high rates
because they are able to collect more revenue utilizing them.
Nevertheless, although higher revenue collection may occur over a
certain range of rates, it does not occur in all cases. When rates are too
high, people change their behavior, and the total revenue generated may
actually decline. If the marginal individual income tax rate rises to
100%, for example, individuals do not work at second jobs and refuse
to work overtime despite receiving premium pay. In addition, substantial
incentive exists not to report income and evade taxes. When the rate is
only 90%, the same behavior occurs to a lesser degree. In contrast,
when the top rate is 5%, people have incentive to work harder and
longer because they are able to keep most earned income. However, a
state has difficulty collecting the revenue it needs to pay expenses using
a 5 % top rate. Accordingly, a government must find the optimum rate
between 0% and 100% that maximizes tax collection.32
While a relationship exists between tax rates and the amount of
taxes collected, a number of problems arise with the "optimum tax rate"
approach. First, determining the optimum rate is impossible.
Individuals have different preferences that continually change. Some
continue to work when government taxes 95% of their income, while
others do not. Some work for a few extra hours, while others work
longer. Their preferences are not known and cannot be easily measured.
Therefore, determining an optimal tax rate involves almost pure
31. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2095 (1986). For a
technical exposition of this law, see A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (1986).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 did not reduce complexity. Arguably, it increased complexity, at least
in some areas of the tax code. It also reduced incentive to invest in tax shelters by reducing tax
rates. Little incentive exists to invest in shelters when tax rates are low.
32. The relationship between tax rates and tax revenues is known as the Laffer Curve, named
after Arthur Laffer, an economist. See CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL & STANLEY L. BRUE,
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS & POLICIES 389-91 (11 th ed. 1990).
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guesswork. Second, one must question whether a government should
attempt to extract the maximum amount of taxes from its citizens. If
government is the people's servant rather than master, it should not
extract the maximum from taxpayers, but should instead provide the
most services with the least confiscation of property.
Some have argued that raising tax rates can beneficially affect an
economy when the economy is nearing full employment and becoming
"overheated." Keynes" and others1 have argued that governments
can use fiscal policy-raising taxes-to reduce overheating and ease
inflationary pressures. Those supporting this view believe that either
excess demand or increasing costs cause inflation. Economists call these
two causes "demand-pull" and "cost-push. " " However, studies over
the years have discredited the belief that excess demand or increasing
costs cause inflation. 36  Unemployment and inflation can exist at the
same time.37 Substantial evidence suggests that an increase in the
quantity of money, not excess employment or low tax rates, causes
inflation, a general increase in the price level.38 Accordingly, those
who argue that high tax rates are proper when used to stimulate
economic growth or cool an overheated economy stand on shaky ground.
Consequently, low tax rates are preferable to high rates. Low rates
result in less distortion to the economy because government takes less
33. See JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
(1936).
34. At least one economist has stated that "[t]axes are needed not to provide governments with
money but to take money away from the public." RICHARD M. BIRD, TAX POLICY & ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 4 (1992). This statement seems a bit extreme, even for a Keynesian.
35. For an exposition of this view, see any economic textbook, e.g., LINDERT &
KINDELBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (7th ed. 1982).
36. See, e.g., THE CRITICS OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS (Henry Hazlitt ed., 1960); DISSENT ON
KEYNES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS (Mark Skousen ed., 1992); HENRY
HAZLIT, THE FAILURE OF THE "NEw ECONOMICS" (1959); W.H. HUTrr, THE KEYNESIAN EPISODE:
A REASSESSMENT (1979); W.H. Htrrr, KEYNESIANISM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT (1963).
37. Events in the United States during the 1970s provide ample proof of this relationship.
Economists have discredited the Phillips Curve, which shows a negative relationship between
unemployment and inflation. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 44,
UNEMPLOYMENT VERSUS INFLATION? AN EVALUATION OF THE PHILLIPS CURVE (1975); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 51, INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT: THE NEW DIMENSION
OF POLITICS (1977); Jeffrey M. Herbener, The Fallacy of the Phillips Curve, in DISSENT ON
KEYNES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 51 (Mark Skousen ed., 1992).
38. Underthe monetarist view or quantity theory, an increase in the supply of money causes
inflation. Under the Keynesian view, excess employment or low tax rates cause inflation. The
monetarist view is not new. It has existed for hundreds of years and provides a better explanation
for the cause of inflation than other theories. Milton Friedman is one of its strongest modem
exponents. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY (1960); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953); HANS F. SENNHOLZ, AGE OF INFLATION
(1979).
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money from producers and redistributes less to tax consumers.
Moreover, individuals do not squander resources on tax shelters that
make little economic sense. Low rates also aid in economic growth
because more money is available for investment. Finally, low rates are
more equitable than high rates because they involve less confiscation of
personal property.
C. Ability To Pay or Cost-Benefit
Two basic and diametrically opposed views of taxation exist: the
ability to pay approach and the cost-benefit approach. Under the ability
to pay approach, the state is a master who extracts tribute from its
subjects on the basis of how much they are able to pay. The state is also
a benevolent father figure distributing tax benefits on the basis of need.
As Karl Marx wrote, "[firom each according to his abilities; to each
according to his needs." 39 In contrast, under the cost-benefit approach,
the state is the people's servant. Government provides services to
taxpayers, and in return, taxpayers pay for the services. Those
benefiting most from services pay the most. Those not using a particular
government service do not pay for it.'
The ability to pay principle involves exploitation. The government
exploits producers, the wealth creators, and redistributes a portion of
their income to wealth consumers, those who use various government
programs. It is a parasitical system. The cost-benefit principle, on the
other hand, attempts to match costs with benefits. Again, those utilizing
government services pay for them, and those not using services do not
pay.41 It is based on principles of equity rather than exploitation.
39. Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in THE GREAT THOUGHTS 274, 274 (George
Seldes ed., 1985). The original wording was "Jeder nach seinen Flhigkeiten, jedem nach seinen
Beduirfnissen." Id. Louis Blanc, the French socialist, essentially used the same words in 1848. Id.
40. Problemswith both approaches exist. Because one cannot objectively determine someone's
ability to pay, one must arbitrarily decide. Furthermore, one cannot determine the benefit an
individual receives from available government services, even when only few people want them,
because bureaucratic fiat determines the price of such services, not voluntary exchange.
41. The U.S. government, for example, would not have punished Leona Helmsley for tax
evasion if its tax system was based on the cost-benefit principle. See United States v. Helmsley, 941
F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1991). The taxes she paid-more than $100 million-far exceeded the benefit she
received. In fact, under a cost-benefit system, she would have been entitled to a refund.
Nevertheless, because she paid several million dollars less than she "owed" under the ability to pay
system and because she used illegal means to prevent the government from assessing the "proper"
taxes owed, the government convicted her for tax evasion and sentenced her to prison. See id.
Ross Perot, during a televised presidential debate in October 1992, announced that he has paid
a total of $1 billion in taxes in his life time. See The 92 Vote: The 2nd Presidential Debate (ABC
television broadcast, Oct. 15, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SCRIPT File. Even if the
government provided Perot with a large home, free clothing, and three meals a day, it could not
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Accordingly, a tax based on the cost-benefit principle is fairer and, all
other things being equal, preferable to a tax based on the ability to pay
principle.42
D. Uniform or Discriminatory Rates
A tax system can be structured to have either uniform or
discriminatory rates. Three basic options exist. First, governments can
utilize a graduated system, a system that takes a larger percentage in
taxes from some groups than others. For example, a graduated personal
income tax takes a larger percentage of marginal income from those who
earn more and a smaller percentage from those who earn less. Such a
system might take 10% of taxable income between $0 and $10,000; 15%
of taxable income between $10,001 and $20,000; 25 % of taxable income
between $20,001 and $35,000; and 40% of taxable income over
$35,000. This system can be complex, with ten or more different rates
based on income level, or it can be relatively simple, with just two or
three rates.
The second option is a tax that has uniform rates. An example of
a uniform tax is the flat rate income tax. 3 Under this system, everyone
pays the same rate. If the rate is 10%, someone with $10,000 in taxable
income pays $1,000, and someone with $1,000,000 in taxable income
pays $100,000. Accordingly, although every person pays the same tax
rate, the wealthy pay more taxes than the poor.
The third option is a tax that charges everyone the same amount,
such as a poll or head tax. ' For example, if the total cost of providing
government services in a particular community is $1,000,000 and 10,000
people live in the community, every individual pays a $100 tax.
A graduated system of taxation is less desirable than a system
charging uniform rates or a system charging each taxpayer the same
amount for several reasons. First, a graduated system is based on the
ability to pay principle rather than the cost-benefit principle because it
possibly provide him with $1 billion in services.
42. However, it should be pointed out that, under both the ability to pay and cost-benefit
principles, government predominantly uses force or threats of force to raise taxes. Accordingly,
both entail significant defects. Nevertheless, in choosing between a tax based on the cost-benefit
or ability to pay principle, a tax based on the cost-benefit principle is preferable. It at least attempts
to match costs and benefits equitably.
43. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAx (1985). Because no tax is
neutral, any change in tax policy benefits some and hurts others. See Murray N. Rothbard, The
Case Against the Flat Tax, in THE FREE MARKEr READER 342 (Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., ed.,
1988) (discussing this point as applied to the flat tax).
44. See J.G. Cullis et al., Public Choice Perspectives on the Poll Tax, 101 ECON. J. 600
(1991).
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discriminates against those who earn more. The more one earns, the
more the government takes in taxes. Graduated tax systems are also
more complex than the other systems. As will be discussed below,
simple tax collection systems are preferable to complex tax collection
systems.45 Finally, a number of utilitarian reasons exist for not
utilizing a graduated income tax. 4 Most importantly, a graduated tax
system destroys the incentive of the most productive people in an
economy by penalizing them for being productive. Because these are
primarily the people in an economy who save, invest, and create jobs,
a graduated tax retards economic growth by reducing the amount of
capital available for investment.
A tax that charges uniform rates has several advantages over a tax
charging graduated rates. First, while the wealthy admittedly pay more
taxes under a flat tax rate, the tax is at least somewhat more equitable.47
Government does not single out individuals who earn more by forcing
them to pay higher tax rates as their income increases. Second, a flat tax
rate does not penalize the more productive individuals in an economy to
the same extent as a graduated tax. Accordingly, it affects incentives and
capital formation to a lesser extent. Finally, a flat tax rate may decrease
class tension. When all individuals pay the same tax rate, the wealthy
are less likely to complain that they must pay for those unwilling to
work.
A tax charging individuals the same amount is the most equitable of
the three options. This form of tax is based on the cost-benefit principle.
Assuming all benefit equally from government services, everyone should
pay the same amount without regard to income. Otherwise, free riders
and parasites take advantage of the system. This system of taxation is
also the closest approximation to a market system. For example, if one
purchases a loaf of bread in a store, the cashier does not ask what one's
income is before quoting a price for the bread. The price one pays is not
45. Seeinfra pp. 51-53.
46. See WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (1953); F.A. Hayek, The Case Against Progressive Income Taxes, FREEMAN, Dec. 28,
1953, at 229.
47. One might argue that the wealthy should pay more than the poor because they have more
property to protect, and one function of government is protecting property. Although seemingly
reasonable, upon close examination, many problems arise in this line of reasoning. For example,
little or no relationship exists between the cost of protecting property and the amount of property
to be protected. Protecting 100 acres of land worth $10,000 may cost more than protecting a bank
vault containing $100 million. See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, POWER AND MARKEr: GOVERNMENT
AND THE ECONOMY 115 (1970). Nevertheless, a flat tax is at least somewhat equitable, whereas a
graduated tax is based on exploitation.
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based on a percentage of one's income. The price is the same for all,
regardless of income level.
However, the poll tax is not neutral because some people benefit
from government services more than others. Furthermore, if everyone
received $100 worth of services in exchange for a $100 poll tax, the poll
tax itself would be unnecessary. Lawmakers could eliminate the
middleman (government) by abolishing the poll tax and allowing
individuals to pay for services directly.
Moreover, although a poll tax may be the fairest of the three
options, governments have historically had difficulty imposing a poll tax.
This difficulty arises because the poll tax is a direct and visible tax, not
a hidden one. 4  Thus, people know exactly what they pay in taxes.
When a tax is hidden, people are less likely to protest because they do
not know exactly what they pay. For example, Margaret Thatcher,
Britain's former Prime Minister, triggered vehement public reaction after
attempting to impose a poll tax. Those who would have had to pay more
under the poll tax protested loudly and, at times, violently. Apparently,
irreconcilable conflict exists between fairness and feasibility when
implementing a poll tax, especially if some, such as the poor,
unemployed, or retired, cannot afford to pay it.
E. Ease of Administration
A tax may be easy or difficult to administer. Needless to say, a tax
that is easy to administer is preferable to one that is difficult to
administer. While this point might seem obvious, many Western
democracies presently impose taxes that are difficult to administer.
Complexities have crept into their systems, making tax administration
more difficult than it needs to be.
Emerging economies should understand the need for ease of
administration and avoid similar problems in constructing their own tax
systems. They should not blindly follow the advice of Western tax
experts. These very experts are responsible for constructing the overly
complex systems that now burden many Western democracies. For
example, the Polish government has called upon the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service to give advice to Polish economists and tax collectors
about the intricacies of the U.S. tax system.49 To many who are
familiar with the needless complexity and unfairness of the U.S. tax
48. See infra pp. 45-46.
49. Officials Outline IRS Help in Setting Up Polish Tax System, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at
G-1 (Apr. 6, 1992).
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system, the thought of the Internal Revenue Service giving advice
triggers responses ranging from hilarity to worry, fear and disgust.
F. Visibility
A tax can be visible or hidden. Which possibility is better? That
depends on the goals a government pursues. If a government's goal is
to raise maximum revenue with minimum protest, a hidden tax is
preferable. An example of a hidden tax is the value added tax.50 The
value added tax is hidden because the people who ultimately pay it,
consumers, do not know what amount they pay for the actual product
and what amount they pay in taxes. As a result, consumers tend to
blame the manufacturer or seller of the product for a high price, when
in fact, a significant portion of the price constitutes a tax. Excise taxes
on alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline are other examples of hidden taxes.
Although the tax may be stated on a receipt, package, or gas pump,
consumers, for the most part, ignore this information.
If a government's goal is to restrain taxation or allow taxpayers to
know what they pay for government services, a visible tax is preferable.
An example of a visible tax is a user fee. If people have to pay $4 to
enter a national park, they immediately know the cost of that particular
government service. In contrast, when admission is free, the real cost
is hidden. Someone has to pay for maintenance of the park, for the
salaries of park employees, and so forth. If government funds these
costs through general tax revenues, the general population subsidizes
those who use the park for free.
Some taxes are partly visible and partly hidden. For example, in
the United States, the government collects personal income taxes by
having employers take taxes directly from employee paychecks before an
employee even receives his pay. The tax taken is disclosed on an
employee's pay stub, but employees do not feel the full "bite" of the tax
because they never actually possess the money taken. The tax would be
more visible if employers did not take it from employee paychecks.
Employees could pocket their full paycheck and then pay the government
the amount owed at a later date. Such a requirement would place more
pressure on politicians to keep taxes low because taxpayers would have
a better feel for the taxes they actually pay. On the other hand, it would
50. A value added tax is a tax assessed on a product at each stage of production. For example,
if raw materials costing $1 million go in one factory and exit as a semi-finished product worth $3
million, the value added tax will be assessed on the $2 million increase in value. The tax will also
be assessed as the product exits other factories on the way to becoming finished.
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also increase collection problems because not everyone would voluntarily
pay the tax as required.
From a strictly moral or ethical point of view, a visible tax is
preferable. Disclosure should be as full and complete as possible.
Disclosure is required on corporate financial statements so that investors
have information about the stocks they purchase. Product labeling laws
force manufacturers to disclose the contents in a package.5' The law
requires bankers to reveal interest charges on the loans they make. In
the same manner, people should know what they pay to the government
in taxes. When they do not, people are unable to make intelligent
decisions at the voting booth.
G. Ease of Collection
Governments should utilize taxes that are easy to collect. A
government imposing a tax that is difficult to collect must budget large
sums of money for tax administration and enforcement. As a result, the
tax system becomes inefficient.
Certain taxes are easier to collect because taxpayers are less inclined
to resist paying the tax. For instance, low taxes are generally easier to
collect than high taxes because individuals are more willing to pay low
taxes. Other taxes are easier to collect because taxpayers are unable to
avoid paying. Corporate and individual income taxes withheld by
employers, for example, are easy to collect because employers collect the
taxes before income reaches the hands of employees. Employers then
turn the proceeds over to the government.52
H. General Fund or Earmarked
Governments place taxes into a general fund or earmark them.
Taxes placed into a general fund are used for a variety of purposes,
while earmarked taxes may be set aside for particular purposes.
Governments generally place income taxes, for example, in a general
fund. Governments often use gasoline taxes, on the other hand, for the
51. I do not advocate the use of labeling laws, but merely provide labeling laws as an example.
Free speech advocates would quickly point out that forcing companies to disclose the contents of
their products violates a company's right to free speech, or the right to refrain from speech. In
cases where pharmaceutical companies must reveal the contents of their drug, a possibility also exists
that their property rights are being violated because they have a property right in the products they
produce.
52. I do not advocate such a means of collection, but merely point out that this approach makes
tax collection easier. The fact that this collection approach makes the tax less visible-and therefore
less honest-overrides that fact that automatic withholding makes the tax easier to collect.
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particular purpose of maintaining highways. Some presently advocate
using a portion of cigarette taxes for cancer research.
Whether revenues from a particular tax are placed into the general
fund or earmarked for special purposes depends on a number of factors.
For instance, the general population may be more willing to accept a tax
increase if it is earmarked for a widely accepted purpose.53 Lottery
proceeds used for education are one example. Social Security taxes set
aside for taxpayers' retirement are another.5" Moreover, earmarking tax
dollars serves as a good control device to insure that a government
actually spends money for its intended purpose. It reduces the possibility
that a government will squander money on pork barrel projects.
However, earmarking cannot be used for every government
expenditure. Dumping taxes into a common pot gives the government
more flexibility to shift spending to needed areas. Accordingly, some
balance should exist between the two.
L Predictability of Flow
Taxes can produce steady, predictable flows of revenue or sporadic,
unpredictable flows. Income tax collection, for example, provides a
steady and somewhat predictable flow of revenue, although collection can
drop during recessions. Lottery revenues, in contrast, can be sporadic
and unpredictable. If people unexpectedly stop purchasing lottery
tickets, the revenue collected falls.
Taxes that produce steady, predictable flows of revenue are
preferable to taxes that produce sporadic, unpredictable flows, all other
things being equal.55  A government relying on sporadic and
unpredictable revenue flows may encounter shortages in funds and, thus,
has more difficulty operating.56
53. James M. Buchanan, The Economics of Earmarked Taxes, 71 J. POL. ECON. 457, 457
(1963). See also JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PUBUC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 72 (1967).
54. The U.S. government does not actually set aside Social Security taxes collected for a
taxpayer's retirement. The Social Security Trust Fund is not a true trust fund because those working
presently pay into the system and retirees presently draw from it.
55. However, all other things are not equal, and therefore some taxes, although producing
sporadic, unpredictable flows of revenue, may be preferable to taxes producing steady, predictable
flows. For instance, an income tax is not preferable to a lottery. An income tax involves coercion
and the weakening of property rights, whereas a lottery does not.
56. Although resulting in less predictable revenue flows, voluntary forms of revenue, such as
lotteries, are preferable in other respects. These forms are more equitable because they rely on
voluntary exchange instead of coercion.
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J. Economic Distortion
From an economic perspective, the best tax is neutral. A neutral
tax allows the market to operate as it would in the absence of taxation.
57
It distorts the economy less, allocating economic resources efficiently by
allowing them to gravitate to their most valued uses. A tax that diverts
economic resources from their optimum use increases inefficiency and
retards economic growth. However, a government must settle for a tax
that is less than neutral because there is no such thing as a neutral tax.58
High tax rates are generally less neutral than low rates. High rates
cause more funds to shift into relatively inefficient paths and cause
individuals and businesses to shift resources into areas that produce tax
benefits rather than wealth. For example, in the United States, prior to
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), which lowered tax rates, taxpayers
utilized tax shelters to shield income from high tax rates. After the TRA
came into affect and tax rates dropped, taxpayers shifted money into
taxable investments that produced wealth rather than tax deductions.
Changes in tax law can also significantly distort an economy, as the
TRA adequately demonstrates. Many assert that the TRA caused the real
estate industry in the United States to go into a depression.59 As one
commentator noted, "In the Tax Reform Act of 1986 .. . legislators
could not have done a better job of destroying [the real estate] market if
they had consciously set out to do so."60 The TRA changed tax law in
three principal areas that, taken together, deflated the real estate industry
almost overnight.6' It eliminated the capital gains tax rate differential,
eliminated the passive loss limitation rules, and lengthened the tax
write-off period for real property.62 These changes destroyed the
incentive to invest in real estate, as shown by the decline in housing
starts every year since Congress enacted the TRA.63 From 1986 to
1990, housing starts as a whole declined by 36%, and multifamily
housing starts declined by 71%.'4 These decreases sent a ripple effect
through the economy and thousands in the construction industry to
unemployment lines.65
57. VON MISES, supra note 4.
58. SeeMurray N. Rothbard, The Myth of Neutral Taxation, 1 CATO J. 519, 519 (1981).
59. INSTTUrrE FOR RESEARCH ON THE ECONOMIES OF TAXATION, POLICY BULLETIN No.
48, DESTROYING REAL ESTATE THROUGH THE TAX CODE (1991).




64. DESTROYING REAL ESTATE THROUGH THE TAX CODE, supra note 59, at 1.
65. The Institute for Policy Innovation estimates that the TRA has had the following effects on
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The TRA has also adversely affected the savings and loan industry,
which is presently in a highly depressed state.' The law requires
savings and loans (S&Ls) to invest a certain percentage of their assets
into mortgages. After the real estate market depression resulting from
the TRA's enactment, the value of these assets significantly declined,
sending many S&Ls into technical insolvency.67 Even those S&Ls not
becoming technically insolvent suffered a severely weakened balance
sheet position. Further complicating matters, the government insurance
fund established to protect investors from losing money in the event of
an S&L bankruptcy presently does not have sufficient funds to cover
resulting losses.' Consequently, taxpayers have had to cover the
difference.
As demonstrated by the enactment of the TRA, taxes have
consequences. Because neutral taxes do not exist, policymakers should
carefully consider these consequences before enacting a specific tax law.
K. Effect on Competitiveness and Economic Growth
Tax policy can negatively or positively affect competitiveness and
economic growth. This effect is especially important to emerging
economies because the transformation from a centrally planned economy
to a market economy entails major shocks to an economic system. As
a general rule, emerging economies have difficulty competing with more
developed market economies because they do not make the products that
developed economies want. In addition, the price is generally too high
the real estate market:
* The TRA reduced the value of commercial real estate by 17%.
* The value of home ownership fell by more than 9%.
• $35.6 billion of the estimated $150 billion S&L bailout cost is attributable to
the TRA.
* The capital gains changes in the TRA reduced the value of commercial real
estate by 9%.
0 Rental costs increased 17.5% because of the TRA's impact on commercial
real estate.
* Changes in the capital gains tax treatment, when combined with lower
marginal tax rates, decreased the value of an owner-occupied home worth
more than $150,000 by between 5% and 6.5%.
* The changes in the treatment of capital gains reduced the value of
owner-occupied housing by about $125 billion.
* Approximately $21 billion of the $35.6 billion in S&L bailout costs caused by
the TRA are due to the tax changes affecting capital gains and passive losses.
ALDONA ROBBINS & GARY ROBBINS, How TAX POLICY COMPOUNDED THE S&L CRISIS (Institute
for Policy Innovation Policy Report No. 109, 1991).
66. Id.
67. The present value of their liabilities rose above the market value of their assets.
68. Id.
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or quality too low on the products they do make. Many emerging
economies have skilled work forces willing to work at competitive
wages, but the system does not allow them to use their skills and
energy.69 Accordingly, emerging economies must adopt tax rules that
foster economic competitiveness, rather than impeding it and that
promote, rather than retard economic growth and development.7'
Additionally, the tax system should encourage both foreign and domestic
investment. An emerging economy can significantly relieve shocks
resulting from the transformation to a market economy by knocking
down trade barriers and importing modem technology. Governments
should not penalize foreign companies for investing in the local country.
Finally, domestic companies should not encounter domestic tax systems
more burdensome than those of other countries.
A number of factors make a tax system more or less attractive to
foreign investors. Most importantly, companies are more willing to
invest in a country that has low tax rates rather than high ones. A
number of studies have shown that, in addition to discouraging foreign
investment, high tax rates retard economic growth.7' For example, one
study concluded that tax increases President Bush signed into law in 1990
have retarded economic growth by 0.7%, destroyed 400,000 jobs, caused
the unemployment rate to increase by 0.45 %, and caused stock prices to
drop by 15%.' It estimated that each 1.0% increase in the federal tax
burden leads to a 1.8% reduction in economic growth.73 Another study
of the U.S. tax system estimated that modifying payroll deductions;
adopting neutral cost recovery; and eliminating capital gains taxation, the
tax on corporate dividends, and the taxation and deductibility of interest
would significantly improve the U.S. economy. 7' Such changes would
69. Exceptions exist. Some of the skills acquired by retirees are of little or no use to a market
economy. Moreover, in non-market economies, where jobs are guaranteed for life without regard
to performance, living under generations of central planning often dampens the work ethic.
70. Commentatorsexamining the U.S. tax system have identified numerous policies that stifle
growth and reduce competitiveness. See, e.g., MARTIN N. BAILY & ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE,
COUNCIL ON RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY, TAX POLICIES FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS
(1987); Anthony Baldo, Killing the Goose: How Myopic IRS Tax Policies Are Crippling U.S.
Competitiveness Abroad, 158 FIN. WORLD 16, 16-17 (1989); A Comparison of Japanese and
American Taxation of Capital Gains, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 719 (1991); Raymond
Haas, U.S. Tax Policies Hurt U.S. Multinationals, 58 CPA J. 62 (1988); Bill Modahl, How U.S.
Corporate Taxes Hurt Competitiveness, 15 FINANCIER 42 (1991).
71. Reynolds, supra note 30.
72. William C. Dunkelberg & John Skorburg, How Rising Tax Burdens Can Produce
Recession, POL. ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 21, 1991.
73. Id.
74. ALDONA ROBBINS & GARY ROBBINS, PROMOTING GROWTH THROUGH TAX POLICY
(Institute for Policy Innovation Policy Report No. 115, 1992).
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increase the economy's growth rate by 1.1 %; increase the gross domestic
product by approximately $6.2 trillion dollars between 1992 and 2000;
increase the standard of living by approximately 13 % between 1992 and
2000; create approximately 4 million jobs between 1992 and 2000; and
increase the stock of capital by $10.4 trillion between 1992 and 2000."5
In another study utilizing a model of the U.S. economy that took federal,
state, and local taxes into account, researchers estimated that every dollar
of extra revenue raised caused production to decline by $0.332.76
Finally, a World Bank study of twenty countries found that nations with
lower tax rates had faster expansion in investment, productivity,
employment, and government services and had larger growth rates. 77
One need not refer to studies, however, to reach this conclusion.
Common sense dictates that a government retards economic growth by
taking a large portion of a company's profits through taxes. The more
money taken, the less available for investment. Furthermore, when tax
rates are high, companies are less careful about how they spend money
because whatever they buy is obtained at a large discount. For example,
if the corporate tax rate is 60%, the after-tax cost of a $100 business
lunch becomes $40 because the cost is deductible.78 If the tax rate is
only 10%, however, the after-tax cost is $90. Accordingly, tax rates
affect behavior. Low tax rates cause less waste and more efficiency
because companies refrain from squandering money when they are
unable to deduct large percentages of their costs.
The tax system should encourage capital accumulation. Ideally, it
should not tax capital or capital gains. Nevertheless, if a capital or
capital gains tax exists, it should have low rates because these taxes tend
to retard economic growth. 9
L. Complexity
A tax system should be governed by simple rather than complex
rules. Simple rules make it easier for taxpayers to understand and, thus,
comply with the law. Simple laws are also easier for the government to
administer and require the use of fewer economic resources. For
75. Id.
76. James L. Paine, Unhappy Returns: The $600-Billion Tax Ripoff, 59 POL. REV. 18, 21
(1992). Paine points out that, using the 33.2% figure, production in the United States in 1990 was
$315.6 billion lower than it otherwise would have been as a result of the tax system. Id.
77. KEITH MARSDEN, LINKS BETWEEN TAXES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SOME EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE (World Bank Working Paper No. 605, 1983).
78. For purposes of this example, we will ignore the fact that some business lunches are only
80% deductible, thus making the 3 martini lunch a 2.4 martini lunch for tax purposes.
79. SKOUSEN, supra note 28, at 170-71.
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example, complex rules might require a large corporation to employ 100
college graduates to ensure that the company complies with a tax law.
If the tax system is less complex, perhaps ninety of these highly trained
employees could be put to work performing activities that create wealth,
rather than transferring it.
Many western democracies utilize unnecessarily complex rules to
raise revenue.' In the United States, for example, tax practitioners and
taxpayers must sift through several sources to decipher tax laws. They
may consult the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations, which consists
of thousands of pages and numerous regulations. They may also consult
volumes of tax cases decided in three different federal court systems,"1
as well as Internal Revenue Service (IRS) publications and privately
published tax treatises. Even then, answers are not always readily
apparent. To make matters more unpredictable, the IRS sometimes
issues a tax regulation retroactively.' Accordingly, a tax rule issued
in 1993 may take effect as of 1981.
Tax rules in the United States are so complex that even IRS agents
do not fully understand tax laws. A General Accounting Office report
found that IRS agents incorrectly assessed 44% of the penalties issued
under the payroll tax rules.' Furthermore, complexity is not limited
to payroll tax rules. The IRS assessed a total of twenty-nine million
penalties in 1990, many of which were later abated.'
Emerging economies must avoid creating a quagmire of complex
and uncertain regulations. First, any tax system adopted should have
built-in safeguards to protect against unnecessary complexity. In
Switzerland, for example, federal law limits the amount of words that
lawmakers can put into a tax law. Second, emerging economies must
80. See James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45 TAX L. REv. 7, 7
(1989).
81. Taxpayers wanting to sue in federal courts have three options. They can initiate an action
in the District Court, the Claims Court, or the Tax Court. These courts often decide similar or
identical tax issues in different manners. Accordingly, a tax court's stance on a particular issue may
dictate where one initiates an action. From these courts, they can appeal to the Court of Appeals,
and from there, to the Supreme Court.
82. See David W. Ball, Retroactive Application of Treasury Rules and Regulations, 17 N.M.
L. REv. 139 (1987); James S. Bryant, Retroactive Taxation: A Constitutional Analysis of the
Minimum Tax on JDCs, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 107 (1983); Bryan T. Camp, The Retroactivity of
Treasury Regulations: Paths To Finding Abuse of Discretion, 7 VA. TAX REV. 509 (1988); Toni
Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of Federal Tax Regulators, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 773 (1987); Sherry Phillabaum, To What Extent Can Taxpayers Rely on IRS Regulations and
Rulings to Predict Future IRS Conduct?, 25 GONZ. L. REv. 281 (1989).
83. Paine, supra note 76. The IRS assesses payroll tax penalties against one-third of all U.S.
employers each year. Id.
84. Id. at 21-22.
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avoid proliferating rules and regulations. Constructing a tax code of less
than fifty pages is not an overly complicated task. Third and finally,
governments should only adopt prospective regulations in order to reduce
a system's unfairness and increase its predictability.
M. Clarity
When writing tax laws and regulations, governments should utilize
clear, easy to understand language as opposed to vague, obscure
language.Y Written laws are easier to understand and, therefore, easier
to comply with. They also reduce uncertainty, make planning easier,
and reduce the need to hire high-priced specialists, which adds to
compliance costs. Although seemingly an obvious point, laws in many
Western countries are often vague, especially in the area of taxation.
Money magazine's yearly surveys illustrate the abundance of unclear
tax laws in the United States. Since 1987, Money has asked fifty
professional tax preparers to complete a federal tax return' for a
hypothetical family. Each year, the tax practitioners, who prepare these
returns for a living, have incorrectly prepared the returns. In 1988, all
fifty gave different answers to the same fact situation.' The tax
liability for the hypothetical family ranged from $7,202 to $11,881."
In the 1989 study, the responses were more diverse." Again, the fifty
tax practitioners gave fifty different answers. 90 However, in this study
tax liability ranged from $12,539 to $35,813. 91 The 1990 study
resulted in somewhat more uniform responses.' The fifty practitioners
again gave fifty different answers, but the Money judges decided that two
85. Courts may hold laws that are unclear and indecipherable void for vagueness. In other
cases, courts may hold a law valid, even though the law is extremely vague or obscure. See Note,
Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARV. L. REv. 77 (1948); Toni Kemmerk,
Note, The Lawson Decision: A Broadening of the Vagueness Doctrine, 13 STETSON L. REv. 412
(1984) (discussing what distinguishes an obscure law from one that is void for vagueness); Jeffrey
M. Evans, Recent Development, 56 WASH. L. REv. 131 (1980).
86. Each year, taxpayers in the United States fill out a tax return that discloses information
regarding their income and deductible expenses. They must compute both taxable income and tax
liability. Often, they hire a tax professional to complete the return because the rules are too
complicated. The tax season generally runs from February 1 to April 15. On April 15, tax returns
must be filed with the Internal Revenue Service, unless the IRS grants a taxpayer an extension.
87. Greg Anrig, Jr., Even Seasoned Pros Are Confused This Year, MONEY, Mar. 1988, at 134.
88. Id. at 135.
89. See Greg Anrig, Jr., The Pros Flunk Our New Tax-Return Test, MONEY, Mar. 1989, at
110.
90. Id. at 111.
91. Id. at 110.
92. Denise M. Topolnicki, The Pros Flub Our Third Annual Tax-Return Test, MONEY, Mar.
1990, at 90.
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practitioners' answers were close enough to the correct answer to be
considered error-free. 3 Tax liabilities ranged from a low of $9,806 to
a high of $21,216, with an average of $13,915. 4 The correct answer
was $12,038. 95
Errors again resulted in the next two Money surveys. In the 1991
survey, % one practitioner actually determined the correct answer,
$16,786. 9  However, the incorrect responses varied widely, ranging
from $6,807 to $73,247.9 In the 1992 survey, none of the
practitioners gave the correct answer, even though the practitioners
constituted the most experienced group ever participating in the
survey. 99 That year, Money magazine instituted a minimum experience
requirement of five years."'°  Regardless, answers ranged from
$16,219 to $46,564, the correct response being $26,619.11
In addition to showing the difficulty tax practitioners have in
applying U.S. tax law, the Money surveys revealed the lack of a
relationship between the fees charged by practitioners and the quality of
performance. The fees charged and time spent varied widely. In the
1990 survey, for example, practitioners charged between $271 and
$4,000 to prepare a return and spent from 41h to over 50 hours to
complete it."0 2 In the 1992 survey, practitioners charged between $520
and $4,500 and worked between 8 and 70 hours.0 3
IRS employees seemingly do not perform their jobs better than
practitioners. A 1987 General Accounting Office (GAO) study of the IRS
telephone assistance program found that IRS employees responded
incorrectly to 21 % of questions asked by taxpayers calling for
assistance." Moreover, based on a similar Money survey that asked
easier questions than the GAO survey, the IRS accuracy rate declined.
In the 1988 Money survey, IRS employees responded correctly to only
93. Id. at 91.
94. Id. at 90.
95. Id.




99. Teresa Tritch & Deborah Lohse, Tax Payers, Start Worrying! MONEY, Mar. 1992, at 88.
100. Id. at 89.
101. Id. at 88.
102. Topolmcki, supra note 92, at 90.
103. Tritch & Lohse, supra note 99, at 89.
104. Greg Anrig, Jr., So How Come the IRS Knows All the Answers When You Get Audited?,
MONEY, Mar. 1988, at 136.
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55 % of the questions."° Another Money test conducted the following
year found that IRS employees responded correctly only 59% of the
time." In later years, the percentage of correct answers increased.
In 1990, IRS employees answered correctly 72% of the time." In
1991, IRS employees answered the questions correctly an astonishing
91 % of the time."° In 1992, IRS employees responded correctly 86%
of the time."° Money attributed these increases to better training of the
IRS personnel answering taxpayer inquiries."'
If practitioners and IRS employees cannot correctly apply the law
to common tax problems, taxpayers surely cannot expect to do better.
Complication is completely unnecessary. A government can devise a
simple tax system capable of collecting the same revenue that a complex
tax system collects. Accordingly, emerging economies should resist
adding complexity to their tax codes.
N. Stability
Governments may enact tax rules that remain in effect for decades
or change constantly. While replacing or improving bad laws is not
undesirable in theory, governments often go beyond mere improvement
and engage in unnecessary fine tuning. In the United States, for
example, Congress has significantly modified tax laws almost every year
since 1981. Few practitioners would argue that these changes have made
tax laws easier to comprehend. In many cases, the laws have become
more complex and obscure over time. Because tax laws significantly
influence business decisions, frequently changing tax laws makes
business planning extremely difficult.
Constant change also increases the costs of complying with tax laws
because tax practitioners and businesses must spend time and money
learning and adjusting to new rules. For example, one study estimated
the cost of complying with the 1987 tax legislation in the United States
to be $6.2 billion for 1988 alone."' The same study estimated the cost
105. Id. Actually, IRS employees may perform their jobs in a worse manner than practitioners.
Money asked each IRS employee only a few questions, while requiring practitioners to determine
the answers to many questions in the process of finishing the tax return. Id.
106. Meet Your Friendly IRS Helper -- If You Dare, MONEY, Mar. 1989, at 112.
107. Denise M. Topolnicki et al., Surprise! The IRS Gets More Helpful, MONEY, Mar. 1990,
at 97.
108. Miriam A. Leuchter et al., The IRS Aces This Year's Money Telephone Exam, MONEY,
Mar. 1991, at 100.
109. Deborah Lohse, IRS Staffers Still Flub More Than One Question Out of 10, MONEY, Mar.
1992, at 92.
110. Leuchter, supra note 108.
111. Robert Genetski, The True Cost of Government, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1992, at A14.
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of complying with the 1989 changes to be $0.1 billion for 1989 and $5.6
billion for 1990. " 2 It estimated compliance costs for the 1990 Budget
Accord to be $23.2 billion in 1991 and $10 billion in 1992.13
Governments must consider such compliance costs before enacting new
tax legislation.
Furthermore, frequent tax law changes reduce foreign investment,
especially in countries with emerging market economies. Convincing
foreigners to invest in an economically unproven country is itself a
difficult task. This task becomes more difficult when a country
frequently changes its tax laws. Russia is one of several countries that
illustrate this point. Russian tax laws are so uncertain and changing that
even government officials do not always know what laws are in effect.
Moreover, when they know what laws are in effect, they often do not
know how to apply them. Such changing and uncertain tax liabilities
scare away many potential foreign investors.
0. Tax Base Width
A tax system may have varying tax bases. For example, a system
taxing salaries and wages has a wide base, although not as wide as one
also taxing individual dividends and interest income. A system also
taxing corporate income has an even wider base, although taxing
corporate income results in double taxation because, in the final analysis,
individuals owning corporation stock ultimately bear the burden of a
corporate tax." 4 A sales tax further expands the tax base by taxing
consumption, whereas an income tax only taxes production. Adding an
inheritance tax widens the tax base even further by taxing the dead.
Utilizing a wide tax base may have several advantages. First, a
government that taxes a broad spectrum of its economy may be able to
lower tax rates. For example, if a government wanted to raise X amount
of money with a tax base that is Y wide, it might need a 20% rate. If
the tax base expands to 2Y, the government may be able to raise the
same amount of money with a 10% rate. Second, a government utilizing
a wide base may be able to reduce its tax system's impact on behavior
and incentives. When a government lowers tax rates by taxing more
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Consumers may also bear some of the burden of a corporate tax, provided the corporation
is able to pass on the tax in the form of higher prices. Stockholders also ultimately bear at least part
of the tax because corporations use money otherwise available for paying dividends to pay taxes.
A corporate tax also retards the corporation's growth rate. This consequence is reflected in a lower
stock price.
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sectors in its economy, people are more willing to work and invest
because they pocket more of the money the make. Finally, a system
incorporating a wide base may be more equitable. With a wider base,
more individuals within an economy pay taxes. Workers, corporations,
investors, and even the dead pay part of the total tax bill."15
P. Effect on Behavior and Incentives
Another factor to consider when constructing any tax scheme is its
effect on behavior and incentives. When an individual tax rate
approaches 100%, marginal income remains constant and, in some
instances, even decreases. People have less incentive to work overtime
and to work at second jobs. If taxpayers believe that they cannot keep
the fruits of their labor, they will not work. Moreover, individuals will
tend to spend, rather than save and invest. Those having money to
invest will seek investments in countries with lower tax rates. Finally,
taxpayers may view high rates as excessive and unfair and will, thus, be
more likely to evade taxes.
Ideally, from a tax collector's perspective, a tax should have both
high rates and no adverse effect on incentives and behavior. In reality,
however, no such tax exists. Instead, there is an inverse relationship
between tax rates and taxpayer incentives to create wealth.
Decisionmakers must consider this relationship when constructing or
altering their tax system. If a government's goal is to increase wealth,
decisionmakers can reduce taxes. On the other hand, if a government's
goal is to increase revenue, decisionmakers should perhaps (but not
necessarily) raise rates. Despite this inverse relationship, governments
in the real world usually want to simultaneously increase both revenue
and wealth. Accordingly, a government must strike a balance between
raising revenue and economic growth.
Q. Effect on Social Harmony
A government should consider a tax law's effect on social harmony
before enacting a tax law. Tax laws can reduce social harmony within
a country in several ways. First, a tax law can increase tension between
the classes in society. The graduated income tax, for example, is
divisive because it forces high income earners to pay what they perceive
115. I do not advocate adopting such a system, but merely summarize arguments that others
have made in favor of a wide tax base. Most taxes in such a system violate property rights, are
coercive and retard economic growth. Such a system also increases complexity and shifts resources
from wealth producing activities to wealth preserving activities.
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as more than their "fair share."" 6  Those paying more in taxes feel
that they are being exploited by those not working as hard or earning as
much money. The graduated tax system further increases class tension
by exacerbating the envy that lower income earners already have toward
high income earners. 7
Second, a tax law can reduce social harmony by negatively affecting
the economic conditions of a certain group within a country. For
example, pension laws in the United States are so complex and the
penalties so potentially large that many employers terminate their pension
plans, rather than comply with the laws. Such decisions adversely affect
hundreds of thousands of employees, many of whom truly need
coverage. In the area of defined benefit pension plans, for instance, the
law has been devastating. During the early 1980s, between 4,000 and
5,000 employers terminated their plans each year." 8 In 1985, 12,000
employers terminated their plans." 9 In 1989, employers canceled more
than 16,000 pension plans, 20 and the number of terminations may be
increasing." Between October 1991 and September 1992, 19,390
employers filed termination applications with the IRS.'2 If the IRS
accepts these applications, pension and profit sharing plans covering
960,876 employees will be canceled." 2  Because Social Security
provides employees little in the form of a pension, these terminations
will force employees to find other means to provide for retirement.
Taxes can also reduce social harmony within a country by reducing
employment. When a government taxes, it takes money that individuals
could otherwise invest and, thus, use to stimulate an economy and create
jobs. For example, one study found that a 1 % increase in the Colorado
State sales tax destroyed as many as 75,000 jobs. 4 Tax increases can
also harmfully affect employment by increasing administrative costs to
businesses. Productivity is reduced when employers utilize employees
116. See HELMUT SCHOECK, ENVY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 194, 217, 221 (Michael
Henry & Betty Ross trans., Harcourt, Brace 1969).
117. Id. at 217, 221; ROBERT SHEAFFER, RESENTMENT AGAINST ACHIEVEMENT:
UNDERSTANDING THE ASSAULT UPON ABILITY 177, 186 (1988).
118. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, PRELIMINARY REPORT: SURVEY OF DEFINED
BENEFIT PLAN TERMINATIONS (1992).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. InternalRevenue Service Statistics on Employee Plan Determination Letters, October1991 -
September 1992, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at L-I (Nov. 19, 1992).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. State Developments: Colorado, DAILY TA REP. (BNA), at H-2 (Oct. 9, 1992) (citing the
Independence Institute of Golden, Colo.).
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to administer a tax law, rather than to produce wealth. For instance, one
study estimated that a law requiring restaurants to collect and report
employee income for Social Security purposes caused 72,000 job
losses. "
Finally, the methods a government uses to collect taxes can also
decrease social harmony by straining a government's relationship with
its people. For instance, in the United States, the IRS, which audits
more than one million income tax returns each year,' 26 sometimes
harasses and verbally abuses taxpayers during an audit. In at least one
instance, IRS abuse has driven a taxpayer to suicide."2 Moreover, the
IRS may utilize illegal methods to collect taxes that are not owed.'2
Such practices only increase existing tension between a government and
its people.
A good tax collection system incorporates safeguards to minimize
governmental abuse of power. At the very least, government officials
should not have the authority to confiscate property until a legitimate
court finds that a tax is owed. This safeguard does not exist in the
United States, where the IRS can confiscate property without a court
order and without a hearing of any kind. In addition, the government
should have the burden of proving that a tax is owed. In the United
States, this burden rests on the taxpayer. Furthermore, in cases where
abuse has taken place, governments should fully compensate taxpayers
for resulting losses. At present, the U.S. government rarely compensates
a taxpayer for his full loss. For example, if the government seizes
property worth $100,000 and sells it for $10,000 to satisfy a deficiency,
the government will only give the taxpayer $10,000 for her loss, and
only if a court determines that no tax was owed. Finally, government
officials who abuse their power when collecting taxes should be subject
to punishment in order to encourage adherence to the law. In the United
States, IRS employees are generally immune from prosecution.
Accordingly, they are not punished for assaulting and battering
taxpayers, illegally confiscating assets, or harassing witnesses. A tax
125. Taxleads, DAILY TAx REP. (BNA), at H-2 (Mar. 9, 1992) (citing the Employee Policy
Institute).
126. Paine, supra note 76, at 21.
127. See GEORGE HANSEN, To HARASS OUR PEOPLE: THE IRS AND GOVERNMENT ABUSE OF'
POWER (1984). The decedent's wife then used the resulting life insurance proceeds to beat the IRS
in court. Id.
128. Congressman George Hansen's book documents some of the many IRS abuses. See id.
See also DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS AND THE IRS (1989).
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system based on equity and fairness must provide safeguards against such
abuses. 2 9
R. Administrative Costs
Governments can construct tax systems with high or low
administrative costs. A gap always exists between the funds a tax
collects for a program and the amount available for spending on that
program because a government must spend some money to administer the
tax. Governments can use funds most efficiently by minimizing the
"deadweight loss" that its tax laws generate.
When measuring the administrative cost of a particular tax law or
system, a government must consider more than governmental
administrative costs. It must also take into account the costs taxpayers
incur in complying with the tax law or system. 30 In the United States,
for example, a tax law's administrative costs fall predominantly on the
private sector. In 1990, the IRS, Treasury Department, and Justice
Department spent approximately $6 billion to administer tax laws.' 3'
The private sector, on the other hand, spent over $618 billion in the
same period.'32 This amount represents approximately 65% of the
taxes collected in 1990."'1 A study by the consulting firm of Arthur
D. Little estimated that businesses and individuals spent 3.614 billion
hours and 1.813 billion hours, respectively, complying with federal tax
rules in 1985. I" If the average employee works 1,844 hours per year,
complying only with federal tax laws would require 2.943 million people
working full-time. "3 Practically every man, woman, and child in a
city the size of Chicago, the United States' third largest city, would have
to work full-time all year to comply with federal tax laws. 136 If these
individuals charged $28.31 per hour,"' complying with federal tax
laws in 1985 would have cost almost $154 billion, an amount
129. It should be pointed out that the U.S. government could eliminate many IRS abuses by
abolishing the individual income tax, or by replacing the present complex tax with a flat-rate tax.
130. See Joel Slemrod &Nikki Sorum, The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax
System, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 461 (1984).
131. Paine, supra note 76.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Paine, supra note 76, at 19.
135. Id.
136. The population of Chicago in 1988 was 2,977,520. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK
OF FACTS 1991 557 (1990).
137. This figure represents the combined hourly average wage for Arthur Andersen ($35.47)
and IRS ($21.14) employees in 1985. Paine, supra note 76, at 19.
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approximately equal to the gross national product of Belgium. 38 This
amount excludes the cost of hiring professional assistance. In 1985,
these costs equaled $5.8 billion. 13 9 Combined with the other $154
billion compliance cost, the total costs, $159.8 billion, amount to
24.43% of the tax revenues collected in 1985.'1
Other studies have also estimated the costs taxpayers incur to
comply with various provisions of U.S. tax law. One pension actuary
estimated that employers will spend over $4 billion in a five year
period 4' to comply with employee benefit provisions in the
Unemployment Compensation Amendment Act of 1992.42 This
amount constitutes more than twice the amount the government expects
to raise from the law. 43  Another study estimated that employers will
spend more than $59 billion for the five-year period ending in 1992 to
comply with payroll tax rules in the United States.' 44 Still another
study estimated that taxpayers spent approximately 2 billion hours and $3
billion to fill out federal and state income tax returns in 1982.145 Tax
law changes since that time and inflation would push these costs to over
$30 billion annually, assuming the average taxpayer expends time worth
$12 to $15 an hour.'" A General Accounting Office study estimated
138. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1991 690 (1990). Belgium's 1988 gross
national product was $153 billion. Id. One should note that this study determined the $154 billion
in compliance cost using 1985 dollars. Paine, supra note 76, at 19. If the study had used 1988
dollars, this figure would be slightly higher. This cost also does not include the cost of complying
with state and local tax laws.
139. Paine, supra note 76, at 20.
140. Id.
141. Withholding, Direct Transfer Amendments Seen Costing Employers Over $4 Billion, DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA), at G-4 (Aug. 4, 1992) [hereinafter Withholding].
142. UnemploymentCompensation Amendment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-318, 106 Stat.
293 (1992).
143. Withholding, supra note 141, at G-4. The actuary estimated compliance cost for a benefit
plan to be approximately $1,500 and annual administrative costs to be approximately $1,000. Id.
Because approximately 600,000 defined contribution plans and 100,000 defined benefit plans fall
within the ambit of this law, the total start-up cost associated with complying would be
approximately $1.05 billion. Id. The annual administrative cost would be $0.7 billion, amounting
to $4.55 billion over the first five years. Id. The government expects to raise approximately $2.147
billion in revenue over the same period of time. Id. As a result, small employers, who are least
able to pay such costs, might decide to terminate plans rather than incurring high compliance costs.
144. Robert Genetski, The True Cost of Government, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1992, at A14.
145. Slemrod& Sorum, supra, note 130, at 461.
146. Forseveral reasons, this estimate is conservative. First, the more an individual makes, the
more time he is likely to spend preparing a tax return. Thus, the $12 to $15 hourly estimate is
somewhat low. Moreover, significantly more individuals pay taxes than paid in 1982. Therefore,
more than two billion total taxpayer hours is presently required to file tax returns. Finally, tax laws
have become more complicated since 1982. Consequently, taxpayers probably spend more time and
more money for professional assistance in preparing returns.
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that taxpayers spent 1.815 billion hours to complete the necessary tax
return paperwork for fiscal year 1988, although that estimate may be
low. 47  Finally, a U.S. Office of Management and Budget report
estimated that the Treasury Department spent 4.27 billion hours in
response-time collecting information during the fiscal year 1989."
The level at which a government collects taxes can also affect
administrative costs. In the United States, for example, local
governments are often able to utilize a tax collected locally, such as a
property tax, almost exclusively to pay for services. Local governments
spend perhaps only 5% to 15% of the amount they collect on
administration. State governments, on the other hand, spend perhaps
20% to 30% of the taxes they collect for administrative costs. The
federal government incurs even higher administrative costs.' 49 In some
federal programs, administrative costs far exceed the amount needed to
provide government services. Therefore, it seems that as the distance
between the collector and the proceeds recipient increases, the
administrative charge increases.
S. Cost and Benefit
Another factor a government should consider when constructing a
tax scheme is the relative cost and benefit to the taxpayer. In doing so,
a government should take into account more than easily traceable
tax-related administrative costs. Administrative costs also cause ripple
effects throughout an economy, and a government must consider these
resulting indirect costs.1 °
147. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PAPERWORK REDUCTION: LrITLE REAL BURDEN
CHANGE IN RECENT YEARS (GAO/PEMD-89-19FS).
148. THOMAS D. HOPKINS, COST OF REGULATION (Rochester Institute of Technology Public
Policy Working Paper, Dec. 1991).
149. Some states resent paying taxes because they feel they are not getting their money's worth
in federal government services. See, e.g., id. (describing New York's resentment). For example,
Daniel Moynihan, a U.S. Senator from New York, asserts that New York State residents paid $838
more, per capita, to the federal government than they received in benefits. Taxes Paid Versus
Federal Funds Received, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at H-4 (Aug. 7, 1992). Over a fifteen year
period, Moynihan believes that the federal government has "cheated" New Yorkers out of $136
billion. Id.
150. See MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM & ROBERT DEFINA, THE COST OF FEDERAL REGULATION
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (1978). These ripple effects are difficult to predict with any degree of
accuracy because consumer behavior cannot be predicted. Nevertheless, administrative costs do
cause resources to flow in directions different from those that they might otherwise take. For
example, if a company must utilize an employee in an administrative compliance capacity, the
company cannot also utilize that employee as an engineer. In the long run, demand for
administrators will increase, and demand for engineers will decrease. This, in turn, will affect
college curriculums. If engineers tend to vacation in Cleveland and administrators tend to vacation
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A government should also insure that a tax law actually increases,
not decrease the revenue collected. While seemingly obvious, lawmakers
sometimes overlook this consideration when formulating a tax law.
Luxury tax laws in the United States provide a good example of such
oversight.' Congress recently enacted a law that places an excise tax
on automobiles costing over $30,000 and on other high priced luxury
goods, such as boats, airplanes, jewelry, and furs.' The excise tax
has stifled demand for luxury products, forcing many dealers out of
business.'53 Individuals who formerly paid taxes on income earned
through the sale of luxury goods presently collect unemployment
insurance or welfare. Consequently, the taxes lost as a result of this law
have actually exceeded the taxes generated."54 Notwithstanding this
loss, Congress has yet to repeal the tax law because of inertia. Many
members of Congress also fear that, by repealing luxury taxes, they
would appear to be coddling the rich. In fact, by not repealing these
laws, they are destroying working class jobs.
III. Benefits and Disadvantages of the Various Forms of Taxation
Based on the attributes discussed in Part II, this section briefly
discusses and evaluates major forms of raising revenue. The forms of
taxation examined include the individual and corporate income tax; the
property tax; the value added tax; retail consumption taxes; excise taxes;
estate, inheritance, and gift taxes; social security taxes; tariffs; and
printing money. This section also examines two forms of voluntary
revenue raising, user fees and lotteries.
in Miami, the tourist industries in these two locations will also feel the ripple effects. There will
also be more demand for air conditioning in Miami (and, consequently, electricity) and less demand
for winter coats in Cleveland, which affects the textile industry in North Carolina. The ripple effects
on any policy permeate the economy in many, often unpredictable ways.
151. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION: LUXURY
EXCISE TAX ISSUES AND ESTIMATED EFFECrS (GAO/GGD-92-9).
152. SeeThe Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(1991).
153. It should be pointed out that this law protects the U.S. car manufacturing industry by
increasing the cost on many foreign-made automobiles. The majority of cars sold in the United
States costing more than $30,000 are made in foreign countries, although domestic manufacturers
are increasingly entering the luxury car market. Thus, the tax law can be used to protect domestic
producers at the expense of consumers, who would otherwise pay lower prices.
154. In addition, the law has probably had negative effects on health. Because luxury
automobiles tend to be large, increasing the luxury tax will cause some consumers to substitute
smaller, less safe automobiles for larger automobiles. Because large cars are better able to withstand
an impact in an accident than are smaller cars, the number of fatal accidents may have increased as
a result of the luxury tax. The number of auto fatalities caused by the luxury tax is difficult to
estimate, but would be a good topic for further research.
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A. The Individual Income Tax
The individual income tax is the principal form of taxation most
Western countries use. As a general rule, taxes on individual income are
undesirable because they dampen incentives to produce' and take
property without the owner's consent. They also cause economic
distortions by shifting resources as part of the redistribution process.
Finally, individual income taxes are harder to collect than other forms of
taxation, especially in emerging economies. A system that collects
individual income taxes from worker salaries and wages only reaches
income derived from the official sector of the economy.'56 Those in
the informal sector often escape the tax. Thus, where a large informal
economy exists, individual income taxes often fail to tax large segments
of the economy.
If an emerging economy chooses to utilize an individual income
tax,"5 7 it should choose the form that is most equitable and negatively
impacts its economy to the least extent possible. First, an emerging
economy should employ an individual income tax with low rates. High
tax rates stifle economic growth more than low rates because they
dampen incentives to work, invest, and accumulate wealth. Studies of
the U.S. individual income tax system, for example, have estimated that
the government loses between $0.24 and $0.47 in production for every
$1 it collects in individual income taxes.
58
Second, it should use a flat rate individual income tax and not a
graduated rate income tax. A number of problems exist with the concept
of a progressive income tax. '59 First, a progressive tax is based on the
ability to pay principle and is, thus, less equitable than forms of taxation
based on the cost-benefit principle. Moreover, the progressive income
tax is based on the concept of redistribution, a concept that some regard
as unethical. 11 Progressive taxation also abuses the concept of
155. Russell Shannon, Incentives and Income Taxes, FREEMAN, Nov. 1981, at 653.
156. BIRD, supra note 34, at 15.
157. Some commentators advocate replacing the income tax with a value added or consumption
tax. This article will discuss both alternatives below.
158. In a 1981 study, Jerry Hausman estimated the loss to be $0.287. Paine, supra note 76,
at 20. In a 1984 study, Charles Stuart estimated the loss to be $0.244. Id. A 1987 study by Edgar
Browning estimated the cost to be between $0.318 and $0.469. Id.
159. See WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (1953).
160. See BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, THE ETHICS OF REDISTRIBUTION (1989). Theorists have
advocated using a progressive income tax to equalize utilities between individuals. However, as
F.A. Hayek and others have asserted, one cannot objectively compare the utilities of different
individuals. See, e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE 260-68 (1970); F.A.
Hayek, The Case Against Progressive Income Taxes, FREEMAN, Dec. 28, 1953, at 229. Even if one
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majority rule. Under a progressive tax, the majority in a society, lower
and middle income individuals, force a minority, upper income
individuals, to pay more to the government than they receive back in
benefits. Finally, the marginal utility theory dictates that taxes should be
regressive rather than progressive. According to this theory, one needs
more to encourage a wealthy man to produce than a poor man. Thus,
if government desires to stimulate production and create wealth, it should
give the wealthy lower rates because the wealthy tend to produce more
than the poor. 6'
In addition to conceptual problems, the progressive income tax
negatively impacts an economy to a larger extent than a flat income tax.
First, progressive taxes cause substantial administrative costs because
they are generally complex rather than simple. Moreover, while all
forms of income taxation negatively affect capital accumulation,
progressive taxation adversely affects capital accumulation to a greater
extent than a flat tax. A progressive tax takes more from those in the
population more able and likely to invest. If a government wants to
encourage savings and investment 62 and the wealthy save and invest
more than the poor, a tax system should not tax the wealthy more than
the poor.
A flat-rate income tax avoids many of these problems. 63  A
flat-tax is more equitable because it is based on the cost-benefit principle
rather than the ability to pay principle. Furthermore, a flat tax is
generally a simple rather than complex form of taxation. Much of the
complexity in the U.S. tax system arises because the system is
progressive and attempts to affect behavior by granting deductions and
tax credits for a plethora of activities. A simple, flat tax could perhaps
eliminate the need for 99% of the U.S. tax code"6 and the
administrative costs that result.
could do so, equalizing utilities is arguably not a legitimate goal or function of government. Isn't
providing services to its citizens the goal of government? Is taking a larger portion of someone's
property because they have more than others ethical? Does it make any difference whether the taker
is a single individual, a group of individuals, or a government?
161. I do not advocate using regressive income tax rates, but only attempt to demonstrate that
the marginal utility theory does not support the use of progressive rates.
162. Arguably, encouraging people to invest rather than consume is not a legitimate function
of government because government should not tell people what to do with their money.
163. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 43 (advocating a flat tax).
164. The amount of the tax code that could be eliminated by adopting a flat tax depends on other
changes Congress could make to the system. Congress could feasibly eliminate excise, estate, and
gift taxes, as well as the corporate income tax by utilizing a flat tax system. Whether Congress
would do so is another question.
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Horizontal equity is another advantage of the flat tax. 65  Under
the present U.S. system, for example, a person earning $50,000 in wages
might pay more in taxes than someone earning $50,000 from
investments. A person owning a home might pay less than someone
renting an apartment. The system's built-in incentives, deductions, and
credits cause these discrepancies and distort an economy. Taxpayers
make decisions solely to save money in taxes, resulting in the
misallocation of resources. A flat tax eliminates these differences
because it taxes a person only on the amount of income earned. The
amount one pays is not influenced by where a person derives income, or
how a person manages income. Thus, a flat tax does not distort the
economy to the same extent as a progressive tax because it removes tax
incentives from the system.
A flat tax also eliminates "bracket creep," the tendency of taxpayers
to go into higher tax brackets because of inflation,"6 because everyone
pays the same rate. Finally, a flat tax eliminates a system's "marriage"
tax penalty, in which single individuals and married individuals pay
different tax rates. 167
B. The Corporate Income Tax
Like the individual income tax, the corporate income tax has several
negative attributes that make it an undesirable form of taxation. First,
the corporate tax is a hidden tax. Unlike individuals, corporations
cannot vote, and thus, politicians encounter less resistance when they
advocate raising the corporate tax. Nevertheless, only individuals
ultimately pay taxes."' Accordingly, the corporate tax is hidden
because those who ultimately pay it do not know they are paying. In that
sense, taxing corporations is dishonest. Assessing a tax on persons who
cannot vote also seems unfair because they are being taxed without
representation.
Second, the corporate income tax results in double taxation. For
example, if a corporation has taxable income of $100 and has a 40% tax
165. Those earning the same amount of income pay approximately the same in taxes.
166. Paul G. Wyckoff, Flat Taxes and the Limits to Reform, ECON. COMMENTARY (Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland), Oct. 22, 1984, at 2.
167. See generally AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, TAXING
THE FAMILY (Rudolph G. Penner ed., 1983).
168. When a corporation is able to pass on the tax in the form of higher prices, individuals
paying for the corporation's products or services ultimately pay the tax. When a corporation cannot
pass on the tax, individuals owning the corporation's stock receive a lower rate of return on their
investment because the government siphons off a significant portion of the corporation's pretax
profits. Either way, individuals ultimately pay the tax.
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rate, it retains only $60 to reinvest or pay dividends. If the corporation
pays $60 to an individual in the 40% tax bracket as a dividend, the
individual pays a $24 tax and retains only $36. Thus, the government
takes $64, or 64% of the corporation's pre-tax income and gives the
corporation's owner only $36.169 Yet, the shareholder takes all the risk
by making the investment. The government, on the other hand, skims
two-thirds of the profit and does nothing to earn it.
Third, the corporate income tax is coercive rather than voluntary in
nature. It is based on the ability to pay principle rather than the cost
benefit principle. Fourth and finally, the corporate income tax can
detrimentally affect economic growth and make businesses less
competitive in world markets. 170 Every dollar a government takes in
taxes is not available for investment. For example, a 1981 Brookings
Institution study of the U.S. corporate income tax estimated that the
country lost $1.39 in production for each dollar raised by the corporate
income tax. 7 ' A 1989 National Bureau of Economic Research study
estimated that production in the United States dropped between $0.84 and
$1.51 for each dollar the government took in corporate income
taxes. 172 One economist estimated that the reduced efficiency caused
by the U.S. corporate income tax cost the government up to half the
revenue actually raised by the tax. 1
73
While all corporate income taxes are generally undesirable because
they are coercive, are hidden, and retard economic growth, some
corporate income taxes are less desirable than others. The U.S.
corporate income tax provides an example of a less desirable tax. Taxes
charged pursuant to the U.S. corporate income tax are not related to the
benefits a corporation receives from government because the tax is
progressive. Accordingly, corporations pay higher tax rates as their
income increases, regardless of the benefits they receive from
169. In the past, the situation in the United States was worse, with a top corporate rate of more
than 50% and a top individual rate of more than 90%. In this situation, the high bracket shareholder
receiving a dividend actually keeps approximately 5% of the corporation's pre-tax income.
170. Corporate taxes also adversely affect economic growth by discouraging foreign investors
from investing in an emerging economy and supplying needed capital. Many have criticized the
U.S. tax system for discouraging foreign investment. See GARY C. HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION
OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM (1992); U.S. FOREIGN TAX POLICY AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE 1990s (1989).
171. Paine, supra note 76, at 20.
172. Id. See also JANE G. GRAVELLE& LAURENCEJ. KOTuKOFF, CORPORATE TAXATION AND
THE EFFICIENCY GAINS OF THE 1986 TAX REFORM ACT (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper 3142, 1989).
173. J. GREGORY BALLENTINE, EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND THE U.S. CORPORATION INCOME
TAX (1980).
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government. Moreover, most corporations probably do not receive
governmental services equal to the taxes they pay because the
government tends to hinder business, rather than helping it. Finally,
corporations that suffer losses do not even pay taxes, although they still
receive government benefits.
The present U.S. corporate tax system also causes administrative
difficulties in the private sector. The largest corporations must employ
substantial personnel to keep records and compute tax liability. U.S.
companies spend more than 500 million hours a year filling out corporate
tax forms.' 74 If the average salary of the person filling out a form is
$20 an hour, preparing these forms costs corporations $10 billion a year,
and these costs constitute only a small percentage of the total cost of tax
compliance. 175
Commentators also criticize the U.S. corporate income tax because
it causes financial distortions to the U.S. economy.' 76 For example,
the law favors noncorporate enterprises over corporations, encourages
debt financing over equity financing, and favors retained earnings over
paying dividends.1 Corporations can deduct interest payments, but
cannot deduct dividend payments. They can avoid taxes at the
shareholder level if they retain earnings, rather than paying dividends.
Nevertheless, corporate income tax law may subject small, closely held
corporations to an accumulated earnings tax if a corporation does not pay
a dividend. A business entity can avoid this tax quagmire by doing
business in the form of a partnership. However, doing so exposes
partners to unlimited liability and makes raising capital more difficult.
This system encourages corporate 'executives to make decisions
based on tax avoidance rather than sound business practices. As a result,
executives allocate resources differently than they would in the absence
of such incentives and sanctions. They allocate resources inefficiently
and retard economic growth. At least one study has concluded that the
corporate income tax is the least efficient major tax. 178  A Treasury
174. Jeffrey J. Hallman & Joseph G. Haubrich, Integrating Business and Personal Income
Taxes, ECON. COMMENTARY (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland), Oct. 1, 1992, at 2.
175. A Coopers & Lybrand study of corporations with sales of $25 million or more found that
the average company assigns 7.4 people to the state and local tax area and 9.3 people to the federal
tax area. COOPERS & LYBRAND, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES: THE BURDEN GROWS 5 (1992).
176. Hallman & Haubrich, supra note 174, at 2. These authors evaluated five proposals to
reduce tax avoidance costs and financial distortions caused by the present corporate tax system. See
id.
177. Although this article primarily evaluates the U.S. corporate tax, many of the points raised
apply to European corporate tax systems. See JOHN CHOWN, THE CORPORATION TAX -- A CLOSER
LOOK (1965) (evaluating European corporate tax systems).
178. See BALLENTINE, supra note 173.
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Department study concluded that integrating business and income taxes
would shift capital to the corporate sector, reduce corporate borrowing,
increase dividend payments, and increase the Gross Domestic Product by
between $3 billion and $30 billion. 79
Consequently, if lawmakers determine that a corporate tax is
needed, they should adopt a tax with certain attributes. The system
should utilize low rates, should be simple to understand and administer,
and the law should not discourage investment, either by foreigners or
domestic investors.
C. Property Taxation
In the United States, local and state governments predominantly
assess property taxes. Real and personal property taxes account for
approximately 37% of state and local government tax receipts t ' and
are a majo.r form of financing local government. Property taxation
shares some of the attributes of income taxation. Both are coercive
rather than voluntary, take property from owners without their consent,
and cause economic distortion.'' However, differences between the
two also exist.
A significant difference is a property tax's competitive effect.
Governments tend to provide services in a monopolistic manner because,
in many instances, they alone provide certain services for a geographic
area. As with any monopoly, costs tend to be higher and the quality of
services lower where no competition exists. When consumers have no
alternatives, governments have no incentive to improve the quality of
service or cut costs. With the competitive tax effect, governments
compete with each other for paying customers (residents who pay taxes).
When citizens and businesses in one community determine that they can
receive a better deal in another community, they move. This migration
depletes the tax base of the community offering less desirable or more
expensive services and encourages its bureaucrats to spend less tax
dollars more wisely."' 2 This competitive effect also occurs for other
179. Hallman & Haubrich, supra note 174, at 3 (noting U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
INTEGRATION AND INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE
(1992)).
180. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 175, at 3. State and local governments obtain tax
revenues from the following sources: real property taxes, 22 %; personal property taxes, 15 %; sales
and use taxes, 16%; corporate income taxes, 38%; and capital-based franchise taxes, 9%. Id.
181. See DICK NETZER ET AL., PROPERTY TAX REFORM (George E. Peterson ed., 1973)
(suggesting ways to reform the property tax).
182. See generally Timothy Brown, Jnterjurisdictional Tax Competition: An Economic
Perspective, 68 NEB. L. REV. 652 (1989).
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types of taxes, such as state, individual, and corporate income taxes.
For instance, many individuals and businesses move from New York to
New Jersey, which lies a short distance across the Hudson River, in
order to take advantage of New Jersey's lower tax rates. Avoiding
federal taxes, in contrast, is much more difficult because individuals have
the option of either paying the tax or moving to another country.3
Of course, not everyone moves from one community to another in
order to avoid high taxes. People sometimes move to a community with
higher taxes when they believe that the government in that community
provides better services. For example, parents in the United States may
move to a new community in order to take advantage of high quality
schools financed heavily by local property taxes. '
A number of injustices involving the costs of public education arise
from property taxes. Most significantly, all homeowners must pay the
tax, even if they do not have children. In effect, they are forced to pay
for the education of other people's children. Moreover, those sending
their children to private schools incur the additional expense of private
school tuition. Furthermore, the cost of financing education through the
property tax is hidden because those using the service often do not know
how much it costs to educate their children. They do not realize that
sending one child to school costs perhaps $6,000 or more per year
because public education is "free." Without knowing the true cost of the
service, parents have little incentive to restrain educational spending.
Finally, even individuals who do not own homes ultimately pay the
tax because landlords tack on the property tax to their monthly rental
bill. Even when a landlord is unable to do so, a renter still ends up
paying the cost of the tax. Landlords who cannot pass on property taxes
must absorb these taxes themselves and, thus, have less money available
to invest in other apartments. The absorption of costs restrains new
housing and increases demand and cost. Landlords also have less to
spend for providing essential lessor services, such as routine
maintenance. In short, the tenant always pays.
D. The Value Added Tax
The value added tax (VAT), like most other forms of taxation, is
coercive. It takes property without the owner's consent. Nevertheless,
183. Actually, U.S. citizens must do more than move to another country to avoid paying U.S.
individual income taxes. The United States is one of the few countries that taxes its citizens living
outside national borders. Consequently, in addition to moving outside the country, an individual
must give up his citizenship to avoid paying individual income taxes.
184. The real estate property tax finances a large portion of local school budgets.
PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES
if one believes that some takings are better than others, the VAT may be
a viable alternative to the income tax. For years, commentators have
advocated replacing the income tax with some form of VAT because the
income tax discourages production and encourages consumption and
leisure, while the VAT encourages thrift and enterprise." Certainly,
if this is so, an emerging economy should consider utilizing a VAT.
Proponents of this tax also contend that the VAT offers several
additional advantages over other forms of taxation. For example,
proponents assert that the VAT is "neutral" because it charges a uniform
rate over the whole consumption base. Thus, the tax system does not
affect methods of production chosen, and producers can shift to more
profitable methods of production without affecting their tax burden. No
penalty results for being efficient." In contrast, under an income tax,
the government penalizes companies that are more efficient and, thus,
more profitable with higher income taxes. In addition, proponents
contend that, unlike the income tax, a VAT does not subsidize waste.
Businesses paying income taxes deduct costs and, thus, can reduce their
taxable income. Under a VAT, no such deductions exist.
A definite advantage of utilizing a VAT is that governments can
raise enormous amounts of revenue while keeping income tax rates
relatively low because the tax base for a VAT is wider than the income
tax base. The VAT tax base consists of an economy's total output of
goods and services, as well as imports minus exports. 7 A 3.5%
VAT, for instance, can raise as much revenue as a 34% corporate
185. MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM & ERNEST S. CHRISTIAN, JR., THE ALLURE OF VALUE-ADDED
TAXES: EXAMINING THE PROS AND CONS 1 (1989). One must still question whether a tax system
should encourage or discourage certain kinds of activity. Many favor using the VAT over the
income tax because they believe government should encourage savings over consumption. Is
influencing taxpayer behavior a legitimate function of government? If one views government as the
servant and taxpayers as masters, one must question whether the servant (government) should really
take interest in how his master (the taxpayer) uses his own money.
186. However, a study of several countries concludes that, in practice, the VAT is far from
neutral in most cases. See GRAHAM BANNOCK, VAT AND SMALL BUSINESS: EUROPEAN
EXPERIENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA 8 (1986). In fact, because all taxes affect
economic growth, the VAT is not neutral. However, predicting where distortion will occur is not
easy. While producers technically pay the tax, they can pass its cost on to consumers in the form
of higher prices. If producers do not pass on the VAT, profit margins suffer, shareholders receive
a lower return on their investment, and employment expands less rapidly. The VAT may also
adversely affect some types of business more than others. Accordingly, one cannot truly state that
a VAT is neutral.
187. WEIDENBAUM& CHRISTIAN, supra note 185, at 4.
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income tax.'88 A 16% VAT can raise as much as an individual income
tax assessed at the U.S. rates of 15% and 28%.189
Commentators in the United States have advocated employing a
VAT to supplement the income tax because they believe that raising
more funds through an income tax is not feasible."9 In one respect,
these commentators are correct. If politicians raise income tax rates
beyond a certain point, taxpayers may react by voting the politicians out
of office. Politicians can avoid this consequence by using a VAT to
raise additional revenue because the VAT is a hidden tax. Those who
ultimately pay the VAT do not know how much they are paying.' 9'
However, because the VAT conceals its true impact on a taxpayer's
wallet, it is an unethical and dishonest form of raising revenue.
Furthermore, the VAT's revenue-raising aspect is a double-edged
sword. Those advocating low taxes see the VAT as a threat because a
government utilizing a VAT can easily raise revenue, or in other words,
take wealth out of the private sector. They worry that "instituting a
VAT or a retail sales tax would be as risky as turning over the wine
cellar key to an alcoholic.""' 2 Moreover, at least one study has
concluded that governments are unable to resist raising tax rates once a
VAT is in place. 93 A government's propensity to raise taxes after
employing a VAT may explain why OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development) countries with a VAT have much higher
tax ratios"9 than those without one.
Computing the correct VAT tax may also be a problem. Basically,
a government assesses the tax on the value added to the product, the
difference between the value of the product as it comes in the door and
188. Id.
189. Id. The study involved made these comparisons utilizing the 1987 U.S. tax system. See
id.
190. CHARLES E. McLuRE, JR., THE VALUE-ADDED TAX: KEY To DEFICIT REDUCTION? 175
(1987). See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF ADOPTING A VALUE-ADDED TAX
(1992) (considering the relative merits of a VAT as an additional revenue source by comparing it
to an income surtax on individuals and corporations). As stated by one commentator, "consumption
taxes alone cannot achieve the ability to pay principle and accordingly could not entirely replace an
income tax." ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TAXING
CONSUMPTION 32 (1988) [hereinafter TAXING CONSUMPTION]. However, as discussed, the ability
to pay principle is not a legitimate principle of taxation.
191. The question of who ultimately pays a VAT or other consumption tax remains, and
economists have yet to agree on the answer. See David G. Raboy & Cliff Massa, Who Bears the
Burden of Consumption Taxes?, in THE VALUE ADDED TAX: ORTHODOXY AND NEW THINKING 39
(Murray L. Weidenbaum et al. eds., 1989).
192. MCLURE, supra note 190, at 176.
193. BANNOCK, supra note 186.
194. A tax ratio is the amount of tax collected as a percentage of taxable income.
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the value as it goes out. In practice, however, the computation is not
that simple. Policymakers tend to make certain items, such as food,
exempt. ,95 Moreover, classification problems exist because
policymakers often assess different raies for different products and
services. 96 Pressure also arises to exempt or charge lower rates to
governmental units and nonprofit organizations. Producers engaged in
both exempt and taxable activities would require apportionment, a
process which could become quite complicated."9
These and other complexities in the VAT cause significant
administrative costs.' 98  Governments must employ thousands of
bureaucrats to administer a VAT, and businesses must spend considerable
time and resources keeping records and filing tax returns.199
Moreover, governments that use a VAT to supplement an income tax
need two sets of bureaucrats to administer both the VAT and the income
tax. Businesses paying both a VAT and an income tax must also employ
additional individuals to comply with the increased burden caused by the
tax laws. Without a VAT, these individuals could spend time creating
wealth instead of shuffling papers .'
The VAT also has other drawbacks. First, it is regressive because
the working and lower middle classes, those least able to pay, give a
higher percentage of their income in VAT taxes than those in higher
income brackets."0 Governments can give some relief to these groups
by exempting certain items, like food and medicine, but doing so makes
the system more complex and difficult to administer. A study of
European VAT systems found that the VAT is also regressive in another
195. The author discovered an easy way to evade the VAT at a McDonald's in Paris. The
French government charges a VAT on food consumed on the premises, but not on food taken
outside the restaurant. Accordingly, one can evade the VAT by telling the cashier that you will eat
the food outside the restaurant and then sitting at a table after you have the food in-hand. Catching
a VAT evader would require stationing hamburger police at every McDonald's.
196. For example, one would have trouble determining whether an anti-dandruff shampoo is a
medicine and, thus, exempt, or a cosmetic and, therefore, taxable. French tax officials engaged in
an extensive debate over this issue. See WEIDENBAUM & CHRISTIAN, supra note 185, at 5.
197. A.R. PREST, VALUE ADDED TAXATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 38
(1980).
198. See Barry M. Freiman, The Japanese Consumption Tax: Value-Added Model or
Administrative Nightmare? 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1265 (1991).
199. In England, small businesses complained about the complexity of the British VAT. PREST,
supra note 197, at 26. As a result, the British government simplified VAT tax forms. Id.
200. One can make the same argument for abolishing the income tax, which has become
increasingly complex. However, a simple, easily administered VAT may be preferable to a
complex, burdensome income tax. Regardless, a government should consider simplicity and ease
of administration in choosing any form of taxation.
201. However, these individuals ignore the argument that taxes based on the cost-benefit
principle are preferable to taxes based on the ability to pay principle.
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manner. 2°2  The cost of compliance and administration falls more
heavily on small firms than on large ones. 3  Emerging economies
must consider these costs when employing a VAT because most
economic growth in an emerging economy comes from small enterprises
rather than large ones.
Second, the VAT adversely affects economic growth. For example,
one study predicted that each 1 % in a VAT would slow growth in the
U.S. economy by 1% and would increase inflation by 1.5% to 2%
during the initial adjustment period.' Third and finally, like many
taxes in an emerging economy, a VAT is not easy to collect. Employing
a VAT will encourage enterprises to do business in the informal sector
of the economy, and an emerging economy will consequently have
difficulty collecting the VAT.
E. Retail Consumption Taxes
Governments can levy retail consumption taxes at the national, state,
or local level. In the United States, most states levy a retail sales tax on
the sale of products but not on services. The federal government does
not presently assess a similar tax at the national level, although
lawmakers have discussed instituting such a tax to supplement the federal
income tax.
The sales tax has many positive attributes. First, unlike a VAT, the
sales tax results in relatively low administrative costs. A government
requires less bureaucracy and paper shuffling because it levies sales taxes
only on the end user.' Because it assesses the sales tax only at the
final stage of production rather than at every stage as is done with a
VAT,' °6 administering a national sales tax is less costly than
administering a national VAT. Reduced administrative costs are
especially prevalent in jurisdictions that already have a sales tax because
the administrative mechanism is already in place.
Second, unlike a VAT, a sales tax, whether at the national, state, or
local level, is visible. A taxpayer sees the amount he pays in taxes
because the government assesses the tax on each purchase he or she
makes. Accordingly, taxpayers are more likely to resist tax increases
202. See BANNOCK, supra note 186.
203. Id. at 24-25.
204. WEIDENBAUM & CHRISTIAN, supra note 185, at 10 (citing Joel L. Prakken, The
Macroeconomics of Tax Reform, in THE CONSUMPTION TAX: A BETTER ALTERNATIVE? 117 (Charls
E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1987)).
205. TAXING CONSUMPTION, supra note 190, at 68-69.
206. Id. at 99-101.
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because taxpayers see and feel the tax. Politicians are also less likely to
raise the tax because their actions are immediately visible to the
taxpayer.
Third, when a government assesses the tax at the state or local level,
as is done in the United States, tax competition often occurs.2 When
neighboring localities or states charge sales taxes, residents tend to shop
in the locality assessing the lowest tax rate. For example, a
Massachusetts resident living close to New Hampshire will shop in New
Hampshire if the state charges no sales tax and Massachusetts charges a
high sales tax. If New Jersey does not assess a sales tax on clothes and
New York assesses a high sales tax on clothes, New York residents will
shop for clothes in New Jersey, even if they must pay a few dollars in
travel costs. 8 Furthermore, New Jersey residents who work in New
York will wait until they get home to buy clothes.
While most individuals do not spend more than a few hundred
dollars at any one time, large out-of-state purchases can significantly
reduce state tax revenues. For example, a New York resident purchasing
a $10,000 fur coat in New Jersey might save hundreds of dollars in sales
taxes. However, this is not the only money New York loses in tax
revenue. New York furriers lose income from lost fur sales and,
consequently, pay less income taxes to the New York government.
Other businesses also lose income and pay less income taxes to New
York. For example, those individuals purchasing furs may also decide
to buy lunch or go to a movie while in New Jersey. As a result, New
York restaurants and movie theaters also earn less income and pay less
in income taxes. Finally, local businesses that lose income as a result of
high sales taxes may move to the low tax state. Such a migration is
increasingly occurring in New York, where high local and state sales
taxes have driven many businesses into neighboring New Jersey. Thus,
decreased tax revenue caused by tax competition, as well as the public's
general resistance to higher taxes, combine to keep sales taxes low.
Another positive attribute of sales taxes is that they charge uniform
rates. Each individual, regardless of the income he or she makes, pays
the same tax on the purchase of an item. Accordingly, sales taxes do not
enhance class tension because the wealthy do not pay a higher rate than
207. See Brown, supra note 182.
208. New York tax officials are so concerned about this phenomenon that they presently record
automobile license plate numbers in New Jersey shopping malls to identify New York residents who
shop in New Jersey. New York State law requires individuals purchasing out-of-state merchandise
to pay a use tax equal to the difference between the tax they paid and the tax they would have paid
had they purchased that item in New York. New York residents almost universally ignore this law.
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the poor. However, individuals avoid sales taxes when they do not
purchase items. Accordingly, because the wealthy tend to spend more
than the poor, they pay more in sales taxes despite the uniformity in
rates. Economists call these effects horizontal and vertical equity.
Taxpayers are treated equally because they pay the same rate.
Nevertheless, taxpayers who earn and, consequently, spend more money
pay higher taxes.'
Taxing sales rather than income may also positively affect the
savings rate. When a government taxes individuals only upon purchases,
individuals tend to save, rather than consume. If savings increase
relative to income, the funds available for investment increase.
Consequently, lower interest rates, lower costs of capital, more
investment, and, ultimately, increased economic growth and job creation
result. This effect does not occur with an income tax because it taxes
both savings and investment. Under an income tax, people are more
likely to consume because their relative after-tax return on an investment
is lower. Studies estimate that a 12% to 15% national sales tax in the
United States would collect the same revenue now raised by the
individual and corporate income tax.210
Other beneficial effects would also result by replacing the U.S.
income tax with a national sales tax. 21' First, this change would
substantially reduce administrative costs. A sales tax is simpler and
easier to assess than an income tax because individuals and businesses do
not need to file a tax return to pay the tax. Accordingly, individuals and
businesses could spend the hours previously used to fill out tax returns
on more productive activities, such as creating wealth. Congress could
almost entirely scrap the U.S. tax code, and consequently, the multitude
of cases, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and other IRS
pronouncements would become irrelevant. Second, replacing the income
tax with a sales tax would also significantly reduce government intrusion
into an individual's private life. The government would no longer need
to audit tax returns for millions of individuals .212 This in turn would
reduce official corruption and the arbitrary use of power.1 3
Despite these advantages, some criticize the sales tax, contending
that it is regressive because the poor pay more of their income in sales
209. SKOUSEN, supra note 28, at 168.
210. Id. at 169.
211. While this Article uses the United States as an example, the same effects would occur in
any country utilizing an income tax.
212. The IRS audits approximately one million tax returns a year, or slightly less than 1% of
the income tax returns filed in the United States.
213. See BURNHAM, supra note 128 (discussing IRS abuse).
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taxes than the wealthy. This view assumes that the poor tend to spend
a higher percentage of their income than the wealthy and that the wealthy
tend to save more than the poor. Empirical evidence, however, suggests
that the wealthy do not save a higher percentage of their income than the
poor.21 4 One study found that savings, as a percentage of income,
declined for seven of the eleven years examined. 25  Another study
concludes that savings, as a percentage of income, remain constant over
time.21 6
In addition, those criticizing the sales tax for being regressive
generally believe that taxes should be progressive, should take a higher
percentage of income from the wealthy than from the poor. They
support the ability to pay approach rather than the more equitable
cost-benefit approach. Aside from being inequitable, any tax based on
the concept of ability to pay exacerbates class conflict and reduces social
harmony by pitting the classes against each other. Under a sales tax, the
wealthy pay more than the poor in absolute terms because they spend
more. The wealthy also receive more benefit from government because
they have more property in need of protection. Accordingly, the sales
tax operates in a more equitable manner.
F. Excise Taxes
Governments assess excise taxes on many items ranging from
alcohol and tobacco products to gasoline, airline tickets, telephones,
foreign insurance policies, and oil spills. While similar to a sales tax in
many -ways,217 the excise tax is more selective because it focuses on a
single item or group of related items. Unlike a sales tax, which assesses
the same rate on a broad range of items, an excise tax can charge
different rates on different items.
Governments can utilize excise taxes to regulate certain activity.
When policymakers want to punish an activity, such as smoking or
alcoholic beverage consumption, the ability to vary the rate charged can
be useful.218 Moreover, a government can limit the use of revenue it
generates from a specific excise tax to the activity generating the
revenue. For example, a government can earmark some excise taxes,
214. See HENRY HAZLITT, THE FAILURE OF THE "NEW ECONOMICS" 98, 113-15 (1959).
215. Id. at 113.
216. ALVIN H. HANSEN, A GUIDE TO KEYNES 75 (1953).
217. See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 453-54 (2d ed. 1988).
218. If the purpose of government is to serve the people, a government arguably should not use
the tax system to regulate private behavior by punishing certain activities. Moreover, a government
that charges different rates on different products makes a system more complex.
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such as gasoline taxes, for highway maintenance and repair, while using
other excise taxes, such as tobacco taxes, for cancer research.
Excise taxes possess many negative attributes. They are coercive,
violate property rights, distort various segments of an economy,219 and
cause high administrative costs because of complexity. Moreover,
certain excise taxes, such as those on alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline,
encourage tax evasion and often feed organized crime. Finally, some
criticize certain excise taxes such as those on alcohol and tobacco,
arguing that the tax falls disproportionately on the poor because the poor
spend larger percentages of their income on these products.'
G. Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes
Estate, inheritance, and gift taxes are forms of raising revenue that
involve the taking of accumulated wealth. Governments levy estate taxes
on the estate of a deceased person, inheritance taxes on those who
receive the property of a deceased person, and gift taxes on the donor or
donee of property transferred before death.
These forms of revenue raising entail considerable drawbacks.
First, they are based on the ability to pay principle. Such taxes cannot
be based on the cost-benefit principle because the deceased are incapable
of deriving benefit from government. Second, these taxes effectively
confiscate and reduce wealth, destroying incentive to work, save, and
invest." Studies show that the right to inherit is closely linked to
savings. For instance, one study suggests that as much as two-thirds of
all capital accumulation results from inheritances.' Thus, because
219. Excise taxes reduce output of the taxed commodity and distort the allocation of resources.
Income taxes also cause distortion, but in a different manner. Excise taxes generally cause more
distortion on the segments of the economy they tax, while income taxes distort a broader tax base.
Controversy exists as to which tax is more desirable. See generally Milton Friedman, The
"Welfare" Effects of an Income Tax and an Excise Tax, 60 J. POL. ECON. 25 (1952), reprinted in
MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN PosIvE ECONOMICS 100 (1953); Earl R. Rolph & George F.
Break, The Welfare Aspects of Excise Taxes, 57 J. POL. ECON. 46 (1949).
220. However, this reasoning is based on the "ability to pay" principle rather than the "cost
benefit" principle. Moreover, the tobacco and alcohol industries use this argument to protest the
imposition of such taxes, which decreases demand and, thus, profits. See Low-Income Individuals
Pay Disproportionate Share of Wine Excise Taxes, Study Finds, 150 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), at D-
16 (Aug. 4, 1992).
221. Karl Marx advocated a 100% inheritance tax as a means of destroying capitalism because
of its confiscatory effect. See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO
(1848), in 50 GREAT BOOKS OFTHE WESTERN WORLD 413, 427, 429 (Robert M. Hutchins ed.,
1952). Equalizing income is not a legitimate goal of government, see generally JOUVENEL, supra
note 160, and I do not attempt to argue that it is.
222. Laurence Kotlikoff & Lawrence Summers, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in
Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL. ECON. 706, 706 (1981).
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estate, inheritance, and gift taxes remove the incentive to accumulate
wealth, save, and invest, wealth accumulation and, ultimately, economic
growth suffer. Third, because many ways exist to avoid paying estate,
inheritance, and gift taxes, they do not raise significant revenue. People
either place accumulated wealth in areas where government cannot
confiscate it, or refrain from saving and accumulating it in the first
place . 3  For example, individuals and businesses may take
accumulated wealth outside of the country to avoid confiscation.
Emerging economies are least able to afford this dissipation of
resources. Indeed, they should consider becoming tax havens, places
where people send accumulated wealth to protect it from confiscation, in
order to provide needed capital at little cost. The State of Florida, for
example, attracts the accumulated wealth of many retirement-age people
by not having an inheritance tax. Retirees move to Florida bringing
lifetime savings and causing a small boom in the trust and wealth
management industries. Accordingly, a government that abolishes these
taxes would notice little change in the amount of revenue raised.'
Finally, estate, inheritance, and gift tax laws, at least in the United
States, are extremely complex. Even tax planners have difficulty
shielding clients from tax liability, and courts have heard thousands of
cases involving estate, inheritance, and gift taxes over the years. The
resources spent administering these tax laws could be better utilized
elsewhere.'
H. Social Security
Emerging economies wanting to emulate social security systems in
Western democracies should first study these systems. Social security is
one of the worst investments a country or individual can make. The
U.S. social security system illustrates this point well. The U.S.
government established social security during the depression in the 1930s
to ensure retirement income for individuals. 22 At first, the program
had little effect on working individuals because the government took only
a small portion from workers' paychecks to finance the program.
Employers paid an equal portion. The present-day system, in contrast,
223. See G. COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAX?. NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOPHISTICATED ESTATE
TAX AVOIDANCE (1979), cited in JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 559 (2d
ed. 1988).
224. Some commentators even argue that these taxes are "voluntary" because only those not
smart enough to plan for their death pay them. STIGLrrz, supra note 223, at 558.
225. Estate of Clayton v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992) serves
as a good example of the complexity of just one estate tax provision.
226. ALDONA E. ROBBINS, THE ABCS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 2 (1988).
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has expanded to the point where combined employee and employer
payments equal approximately 15% of an employee's salary.'m  The
amount taken will only increase over time.
A significant part of the problem is structural.' The U.S.
government does not place the money taken into a trust fund to
accumulate until a person's retirement. The government instead takes
money from those presently employed to support people who have
retired. When those presently working retire, they will have to depend
on younger generations for support because the money taken from their
paychecks will have already been spent. Since people are having less
children, living longer, and retiring earlier, the funds taken from the
system will soon exceed the funds being put in. In time, the system will
run out of money, and those who previously paid will have nothing for
retirement. 229
The system is also structurally defective because it penalizes those
who work beyond the retirement age. Those individuals lose their
benefits when they earn over a certain amount. Consequently, the
system forces many knowledgeable and productive people into retirement
when they could be contributing to economic growth.' Aside from
structural defects, bureaucrats who control the system have consistently
mismanaged it."' Despite these problems, lawmakers are afraid to
reform the system because they believe that retirees who fear having
their benefits cut off or reduced will vote them out of office. 2
227. In some European systems, combined employer and employee payments constitute a larger
percentage of an employee's salary. One individual estimates that, unless significant changes are
made, the U.S. government may eventually have to take 40% to 50% of an employee's salary to
meet social security obligations. See John C. Goodman, Private Alternatives to Social Security: The
Experience of Other Countries, in SOCIAL SECURITY: PROSPECTS FOR REAL REFORM 103 (Peter J.
Ferrara ed., 1985).
228. An ethical question exists because government confiscates an individual's
property-wages-to pay for another individual's retirement. If government must confiscate an
individual's property, it should set aside the property for that individual's retirement, rather than
utilizing it for those who have already retired. Moreover, one must ask whether forcing citizens to
save is a legitimate governmental function. Many have concluded that it is not. See, e.g., MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM 187-89 (1962).
229. In addition, intergenerational conflict will result as young people are forced to support the
elderly. See GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING: KNOWING WHO PAYS, AND WHEN, FOR WHAT WE
SPEND (1992), reviewed in Susan Lee, Tax-System Troubles, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1992, at A18.
230. SeeALDONA ROBBINS & GARY ROBBINS, PAYING PEOPLE NOr TO WORK: THE ECONOMIC
COST OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT EARNINGS LIMIT (The Institute for Policy Innovation
Policy Report No. 101 and the National Center for Policy Analysis Policy Report No. 142, 1990).
231. See MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1990).
232. See Loren E. Lomasky, Is Social Security Politically Untouchable? 5 CATO J. 157 (1985).
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An alternative to government involvement is the fully privatized
social security system. 3 Several benefits result from such a system.
Most importantly, money taken from employee paychecks is set aside
and invested. These funds are placed into an investment vehicle that
grows over time, such as stocks, bonds, or mutual funds. Those
contributing accumulate wealth and have property rights in the
accumulation.2 The whole economy benefits because the capital
available for borrowing and investment grows, reducing interest rates and
making borrowing easier. In short, a privatized system fosters economic
growth and creates jobs. A privatized system has a simple psychological
benefit as well. Workers do not have to worry about supporting
themselves upon retirement.
L Tariffs
Prior to utilizing income taxes, the U.S. government primarily used
tariffs to raise revenue. Presently, the government uses tariffs more to
protect domestic industry from foreign competition than to raise revenue.
The government would probably better serve the vast majority of the
public by abolishing all tariffs.
A principal problem with tariffs is that they raise the price
consumers must pay for imported products and, thus, decrease the
standard of living. Various studies estimate that trade protectionism in
the United States costs perhaps $65 to $80 billion a year. Protectionism
also destroys more jobs than it creates and is, therefore, especially
harmful to an emerging economy trying to expand employment.35
Finally, protectionism enhances tension between different groups. It pits
consumers, who want low prices and high quality, against producers,
who desire government protection from foreign competition. It also pits
domestic industries against each other. For example, the steel industry
may want tariffs to stem the flow of cheap foreign steel into the country.
233. Many have put forth proposals for privatizing the social security system. See, e.g., HENRY
J. AARON ET AL., CAN AMERICA AFFORD TO GROW OLD? 117-20 (1989); PETER J. FERRARA,
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE INHERENT CONTRADICTION (1980); PETER J. FERRARA, SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM: THE FAMILY PLAN (1982); James M. Buchanan & Colin D. Campbell, Voluntary Social
Security, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1966, at 14.
234. Underthe present U.S. system, in contrast, the government does not pay money taken from
a deceased worker's pay over the years to the worker's heirs. Moreover, because social security
payments stop when a person dies, no wealth accumulation can result.
235. See GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., TRADE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: 31 CASE
STUDIES (1986).
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In contrast, the auto industry may not desire tariffs so that it can keep its
own costs low by buying cheap foreign steel,236
J. Printing Money
Printing money is one of the easiest methods an emerging economy
can use to raise revenue. It is also one of the most harmful. 7 Most
importantly, printing money leads to inflation, alters behavior, and
causes distortion in the economy. 8 The price mechanism, which acts
as a signalling device for the communication of information, cannot
adequately function when prices are continuously rising. Moreover,
foreign investors hesitate to invest in countries with high inflation rates
because inflation increases uncertainty. Finally, inflationary expectations
cause people to spend, rather than to save and invest, and are thus
especially counterproductive in an economy that needs growth. While
some economists contend that a stable rate of inflation fosters sound
economic decisionmaking,3 9 others argue that zero inflation,' ° or
even a gently declining price level,24' promotes better economic
decisionmaking.
Economists have proposed indexing2 to neutralize the inflation
tax, and several countries have tried this method with varying degrees of
success. 243 However, indexing does not stop inflation or the
accompanying misallocation of economic resources because an increase
in the supply of money causes inflation. Others have proposed
privatizing the money supply as a long-term solution to inflation.2'
Privatizing the money supply stops inflation dead in its tracks and takes
away the governmental monopoly on money. 5
236. See I.M. DESTLER & JOHN S. ODELL, ANTI-PROTECION: CHANGING FORCES IN UNITED
STATES TRADE POLITICS (1987).
237. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 109-34 (1980) (discussing inflation as a tax).
238. Using inflation to raise revenue is also a dishonest form of taxation because it raises
revenue without corresponding legislation.
239. JAMES G. HOEHN, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, STABLE INFLATION FOSTERS
SOUND ECONOMIC DECISIONS, ECONOMIC COMMENTARY (May 1, 1988).
240. WILLIAM T. GAVIN & ALAN C. STOCKMAN, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND,
THE CASE FOR ZERO INFLATION, ECONOMIC COMMENTARY (Sept. 15, 1988).
241. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, 2 MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE 865 (1962).
242. The consumer price index or some other index could be used for this purpose. If the index
rises by 5 % in a given year, the amount of taxable income in each tax bracket also goes up by 5%.
243. See DAVID R. MORGAN, OVER-TAXATION BY INFLATION (1977).
244. See F.A. HAYEK, CHOICE IN CURRENCY: A WAY TO STOP INFLATION (1976); F.A.
HAYEK, DENATIONALIZATION OF MONEY: THE ARGUMENT REFINED (3d ed. 1990).
245. Space does not permit a full discussion of these effects. Nevertheless, a few points can be
made. In most countries, money is a government monopoly. As is the case with all monopolies,
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This solution is especially enticing for an emerging democracy
whose currency is not recognized beyond its own borders.. Privatization
can fill the void that currently exists for a stable currency in some
emerging economies. Privatizing the currency in a Western democracy,
on the other hand, might prove more difficult because its currency might
already be widely accepted beyond its borders. Accordingly, people will
probably have little or no need to change the currency because they do
not have problems using it.
K. User Fees
User fees are fees the government charges for using a government
service or government property. Examples of user fees include
governmental electric, gas, and water company charges; subway and bus
fares; garbage collection fees; admission fees to public zoos, parks, and
museums; turnpike tolls; and gasoline taxes.246 User fees are fairer
than most forms of taxation because they link cost to benefit. Those
actually using the service pay for it, while those not using the service do
not pay.
A government can utilize user fees to finance many of the services
historically paid for through general tax revenues, 7 such as public
education. In the United States, property owners and, to a lesser extent,
income earners pay for public education whether or not they have
children. When a government finances education through user fees,
individuals with children alone pay for the costs of educating their
children.
User fees could also be utilized to provide fire fighting services. In
some U.S. communities, for example, residents subscribe to a local
provider for fire protection. In the event of a fire, these residents call
the fire prevention agency, which extinguishes the fire free of charge.
Individuals who do not subscribe may also obtain protection, although
they must pay a premium when they use the service. In many instances,
these fire protection agencies provide services more efficiently and at a
the absence of competition results in higher prices and lower quality than would be the case under
competitive conditions. Privatizing money-allowing private suppliers to supply it-enhances the
quality of the money supply. In all likelihood, private money would be backed by some commodity
(as it has been historically) that would reduce or eliminate the possibility of inflation.
246. See G.J. ROTH, A SELF-FINANCING ROAD SYSTEM (1966). Arguably, the government
should not regulate these activities because the market-private companies-can provide these
services at a lower cost and in a better manner. See POOLE, supra note 26; FrrZGERALD, supra note
26; BENNETT & JOHNSON, supra note 26.
247. See FITZGERALD, supra note 26; E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 95-96
(1982); POOLE, supra note 26.
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lower cost than governmental fire fighters. Moreover, homeowners
using this service often pay lower fire insurance premiums.
The legal system is another area that can operate on a user fee
basis.' For instance, in the United States, the American Arbitration
Association and other groups settle disputes faster and cheaper than the
government court system. Moreover, many advocate establishing
competing private police forces to which consumers could subscribe as
they now do for private fire protection.249 In fact, some police forces
are already privatized. Many companies presently employ private
security guards to protect company property.
L. Lotteries
In one sense, lotteries are the most desirable form of taxation
because they entail no coercion. Government doesn't confiscate property
or force one individual to pay for another's benefits. Moreover, lotteries
are generally simple and easy to administer. 250 Several states in the
United States use lotteries to raise substantial revenue. For instance,
Florida raises more than $2 billion a year utilizing a lottery."1  An
emerging economy that limits spending and privatizes wherever possible
may be able to eliminate coercive forms of taxation by raising revenue
solely through lotteries and user fees.
M. Capital Gains Taxes
Governments assess capital gains taxes when certain assets are sold
at a "profit." For example, an individual or corporation that buys 100
shares of stock in 1975 for $1,000 and sells the stock in 1993 for
$1,500, makes a $500 "profit" on the sale. If the capital gains tax is
30%, tax liability is $150 (30% of $500).
Capital gains taxes have many serious shortcomings. First, most
capital gains taxes do not take inflation into account in determining
whether a profit has been made. In the previous example, if the rate of
inflation between 1975 and 1993 was 300% (a rate that is much lower
than what has occurred in many emerging economies), the purchasing
power of $1,000 in 1975 dollars is equivalent to $3,000 in 1993 dollars.
Hence, the owner of the stock incurs a real loss of $1,500 upon sale of
248. See POOLE, supra note 26, at 51-61; FITZGERALD, supra note 26, at 93-119.
249. MuRRAY N. ROTHBARD, POWER AND MARKET: GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY 123
(1970).
250. Some do not favor using lotteries to raise government revenue because lotteries involve
gambling and are, thus, seen as immoral.
251. Record-BreaingLottery, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Jan. 19, 1990, at H-2.
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the stock. This amount equals the difference between $3,000 and the
$1,500 received on the sale, both measured in 1993 dollars. Therefore,
the stockholder must pay a capital gains tax on the $500 "profit,"
although a real loss of $1,500 actually occurred. This result is unfair
because the taxpayer loses twice, once when he sells the stock at a real
loss and again when he pays a tax on a gain that he never realized.
Second, high capital gains tax rates retard economic growth because
money taken in a capital gains tax is not available for further investment,
and investment leads to industrial expansion and job creation. For
instance, industrial countries that generally have high economic growth
rates, such as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Italy, either exempt
capital gains from taxation or have a very low capital gains tax rate. In
contrast, industrial countries that generally have low rates of economic
growth, such as Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, have high
capital gains tax rates. 52
Third, capital gains taxes create administrative costs in both the
public and private sectors. Fourth and finally, other more desirable
forms of taxation, such as the income tax or value added tax, can raise
almost as much revenue as the capital gains tax. A study by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, for instance, found that the U.S.
government would realize slightly -more revenue in the absence of a
capital gains tax because of the Laffer Curve effect. 23  Hence, to
remain competitive and to enhance economic growth, an emerging
democracy should not tax capital gains.
IV. The Need To Limit Taxation
Governments should eliminate taxation wherever possible. When
a government taxes, individuals have less money to spend and, thus,
have a lower standards of living. Moreover, higher taxes leave less
money for savings and investment. If a government absorbs money
otherwise available for savings and investment, businesses do not have
the funds needed to invest and grow. Finally, decreasing the funds
available for spending, savings, and investment causes interest rates to
rise. Given these effects, governments should utilize revenue raising
methods that limit taxation.
252. SKOUSEN,supra note 28, at 170-71.
253. Paine, supra note 76, at 20-21 (study conducted by Roger Gordon and Joel Slenrod in
1983).
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A. Tax Limitation Methods
Many tax limitation methods have been proposed in the United
States and other countries. The main methods proposed and/or tried are
the balanced budget amendment, the -line-item veto, supermajority
requirements, referendums, sunset provisions, stating an upper limit in
the constitution, and privatization. An emerging democracy should
utilize the methods best suited for its particular situation.
1. Balanced Budget Amendment.-A balanced budget amendment
added to a country's constitution slows government growth. This option,
however, is not always feasible. For example, the U.S. Congress has
been unwilling to implement a balanced budget amendment, although
most state constitutions already utilize this method of tax limitation.
Additionally, countries lacking a written constitution, such as Great
Britain, are also unable to employ a balanced budget amendment as a
means of curbing government taxation.
2. Line-Item Veto.-The line-item veto acts as a spending restraint.
In the case of the United States, Congress often combines several
proposals into a single bill that the President must either sign or veto.
Congressional members sometimes insert unpopular and otherwise
unacceptable provisions into a piece of legislation. Although the bill may
contain unacceptable provisions, the President must sign the bill if he
wants other needed provisions to be implemented. The line-item veto
would allow the President to reject specific proposals within a piece of
legislation. Hence, the President could exercise spending restraint when
Congress is unwilling or unable to do so.
3. Supermajority Requirement.-A supermajority requirement
requires more than a 50.001% majority vote to pass a bill into law.
Various supermajority vote proposals have been suggested in the United
States, but none have passed perhaps because Congress does not want to
give up some of its power. Establishing a supermajority requirement, at
least for spending bills, may be feasible in an emerging democracy where
political power is less secure.
As the percentage requirement increases, it becomes more difficult
to raise taxes and to increase spending. Therefore, there are several
options to choose from. For example, a constitution might require a
two-thirds vote for passage of a spending bill and a three-fourths vote for
raising taxes. Perhaps a simple majority would be required to reduce
taxes or repeal a law. Any of these combinations could be added to a
country's constitution.
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4. Referendum.-A referendum submits to popular vote any
measure that seeks to raise taxes. Because the voters themselves approve
all tax increases, legislative representatives are unable to clandestinely
raise taxes. Although a referendum requirement presents some
administrative problems, it seems to restrain governmental power to tax
and spend.
5. Sunset Provisions.-A sunset provision places a time limit on the
validity of a law. Laws are easier to enact than to repeal. Sunset
provisions that limit the applicability of a law to five years, for example,
make it easier to repeal laws that are unpopular or no longer carry out
their intended purpose.
6. Stating an Upper Limit in the Constitution.-An upper limit in
a country's constitution prohibits taxation above a certain percentage and,
thus, limits government taxation. For example, a constitution can
prohibit taxing more than 25 % of an individual's income. However,
lawmakers may attempt to circumvent a constitutional provision by
enacting other taxes, such as a VAT or sales tax. Accordingly, a
government must carefully word a provision to eliminate such legislative
maneuvers.
7. Privatization.-Privatization reduces the need for taxation.
Empirical evidence suggests that the market can provide most services
to the public at a lower cost than the government.54 The worldwide
movement toward privatization of government services provides
numerous examples of this phenomenon. 25  Municipal solid waste
disposal costs 61% to 71 % more when done by government.5 6 Over
the same time period and under similar conditions, 68% more U.S.
government employees are needed to remove 21% of the amount of
railroad track that private sector employees can clear away.5 7 Private
companies charge 25 % less to build a prison than the U.S. government
254. Contact the Local Government Center, c/o Reason Foundation, 3415 South Sepulveda
Boulevard, Suite 400, Los Angeles, CA 90034 USA, to obtain case studies that support this view.
255. See OLIVER LErWIN, PRIVATIZING THE WORLD: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
PRIVATISATION IN THEORY AND PRACTIcE (1988).
256. SAVAS, supra note 247, at 93; see also Barbara J. Stevens, Solid Waste Management, in
PRIVATIZATION FOR NEW YORK: COMPETING FOR A BE=rER FUTuRE 215 (1992) (Contracting out
waste disposal to private companies saves between 22% and 30% in costs.).
257. FITZGERALD, supra note 26, at 17. Fitzgerald found that 77 private railroad employees
could remove 344 miles of track in the same amount of time that it took 129 Amtrak employees to
remove 71.8 miles of track. id.
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charges.158 Moreover, they can do it in less than one year, compared
to the five years needed by the government. 9
A study of 121 cities in the Los Angeles County area found that
contracting out street cleaning to the private sector saved an average of
43% in street cleaning costs.' The cost savings in the following other
areas are also substantial: 73% for janitorial services, 42% for refuse
collection, 56% for traffic signal maintenance, 96% for asphalt overlay
construction, 40% for grass maintenance, and 37% for street
maintenance.26' Private fire companies respond quicker to fires and
cost approximately half as much as government fire departments.262
Other examples include police protection,' the legal system,'
emergency ambulance service, 5 leisure and recreational services, 2'
transit systems, 7 social services and health care,' planning and
zoning,69 public works,27 and city management."
In terms of total cost, perhaps the largest potential savings from
privatization occurs in the area of education. Financing public education
constitutes a major expenditure of government, especially in Western
democracies, which have small government sectors. ' Moreover,
privatizing education improves the quality of education provided. For
example, a New York State study reached the following conclusion:
Although the goal of educational choice is to give our children a
better education, [privatization] would also eliminate stultifying and
expensive educational bureaucracies and may yield significant
savings. While these are very difficult to estimate, some proponents
reason as follows: Superior education is achieved in private schools
258. Id.
259. Id. Private companies are also able to operate prisons at less cost and to provide higher
quality services. See CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS (1990).
260. JOHN C. GOODMAN, PRIVATIZATION 119 (1985).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 122; FITZGERALD, supra note 26, at 72, 75-79.
263. POOLE, supra note 26, at 37-50.
264. Id. at 51-61.
265. Id. at 79-87.
266. Id. at 99-109.
267. Id. at 110-125.
268. POOLE, supra note 26, at 126-35.
269. Id. at 136-46.
270. Id. at 147-57.
271. Id. at 158-71.
272. As countries in the former Soviet bloc convert to market economies, they are rapidly
changing their educational systems. See, e.g., EMESE P. FAYNI, ENLARGEMENT OF EC: CASE OF
AUSTRIA AND THE HUNGARIAN ATTITUDE 7-8 (1990) (presented at the Second Integration
Symposium, Confederation of European Economic Associations, Lille, France).
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where the per-pupil cost is less than half the cost in public schools.
New York spent $7,338 per pupil in 1989. Therefore, if the national
experience can be replicated in New York, per-pupil expenditures
could be less than $3,700. Even if one inflates this figure by fifty
percent, it still amounts to saving of $1,834 per student. For New
York City alone, the savings could be $1.7 billion. For the entire
state, with 2.57 million students, the saving could amount to as much
as $4.7 billion."
A number of reasons for the lower cost exist, the primary reason
being simply that different structures produce different results. The
government has a near monopoly in providing education and, thus,
provides services like a monopoly. The quality of service is low and the
cost higher than what exists under competitive conditions.
Costs in providing public education have risen faster than
inflation,274 yet student scores on standardized tests have declined.27
Between 1970 and 1990, the cost per pupil increased by 489%, while
inflation was 213% - a real increase of 88%.276 In some school
districts, less than half of those on the payroll actually do any
teaching.277 In contrast, at many private schools, more than 90% of
those on the payroll are teachers. 271
A New York City Comptroller study279 found that, while
educating one severely handicapped student in a government school cost
$6,196, it cost private schools under contract with the city government
$4,730.2 ° The difference in cost equals a savings of $1,466, or 24%
using the government school cost as the base."8  A New York State
Senate study determined the total cost in 1990 of educating one student
in a public school to be $4,929, approximately twice the cost of
educating a student in a Catholic school.' 2 The cost of educating a
student in Boston rose from a little over $1,000 in 1971 to $4,000 in
273. JohnE. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Education, in PRIVATlZATION FOR NEW YORK 106, 107
(1992).
274. POOLE, supra note 26, at 173.
275. GOODMAN, supra note 260, at 123. See also Chubb & Moe, supra note 273, at 109,
115-19.
276. Chubb & Moe, supra note 273, at 111.
277. GOODMAN, supra note 260, at 123.
278. POOLE, supra note 26, at 179.
279. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE COST AND FINANCING OF
SPECIAL EDUCATION TO HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY (1978), cited in SAVAS,
supra note 247, at 115, n.44.
280. SAVAS, supra note 247, at 102.
281. Id.
282. Chubb& Moe, supra note 273, at 111.
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1981, making Boston's school system the second most expensive large
school system in the country. 3 By 1985, although the per pupil cost
had risen to approximately $5,400, Boston's high school seniors scored
more than 200 points below average on the scholastic aptitude test.2s
Accordingly, simply throwing money at the problem will not solve it.
The problem rests not with insufficient funds, but is structural.
Lower cost structures prevail in the private sector at all levels of
education. A New York State Department of Education study found that
disadvantaged students in educational opportunity programs were
graduated from private universities at a much lower cost ($18,570) than
students at government-run universities ($103,061), although public funds
were used for both types of programs.2s  In other words, private
universities provided education at 18% of what it cost for a government-
run university to provide education.286
Voucher systems are an increasingly popular solution to the
problems of government-run schools .2 7 Educational vouchers shift the
emphasis on providing education away from the government towards the
individual, away from central planning to a consumer-driven market
approach. In a traditional educational system, the government provides
schools, and children attend the school closest to their home. They have
no choice in the matter.
Under a voucher system, the government gives each child a ticket
or voucher equal to a certain cash equivalent. The children then
exchange the voucher for admission to the school of their choice. For
example, if educating a high school student in a particular school district
costs $5,000, that district gives each high school student a voucher
entitling the child's parents to purchase $5,000 worth of education at the
school of their choice. The school chosen turns the voucher into the
school district in exchange for a $5,000 check. Parents desiring to send
their child to a private school costing $6,000 give the voucher and pay
for the remaining $1,000. If they find a school that charges only
283. FITZGERALD, SUPra note 26, at 139.
284. Id.
285. SAVAS, supra note 247, at 103.
286. Id.
287. Numerous books and articles exist concerning the various voucher systems that have been
proposed and tried. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT 158 (1980); DAVID W. KIRKPATRICK, CHOICE IN SCHOOLING: A CASE FOR TUITION
VOUCHERS (1990); ALAN MAYNARD, EXPERIMENT WITH CHOICE IN EDUCATION (1975); ARTHUR
SELDON, THE RIDDLE OF THE VOUCHER (1986). Milton Friedman was one of the first to suggest
vouchers as a solution to the state's education monopoly. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 228, at 85-
107.
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$4,500, they give the voucher and receive a $500 rebate, if permitted
under a system's rules.
The voucher system breaks the government monopoly on providing
education by giving educational consumers a choice. Parents are able to
send their children to the school nearest to them, but are not required to
do so. If they can find a better school willing to admit their child, the
parents can upgrade the quality of their children's education at no cost
by abandoning the school they deem to be of inferior quality. Schools
are consequently forced to compete for students by providing better
education. Schools providing inferior education lose students and face
the possibility of closing.'
Injecting market forces into education reduces educational costs by
forcing schools to become more cost conscious. Incentives exist to cut
costs and spend money efficiently as any business must do to survive.
Numerous examples exist of costs being reduced by 20% to 50% after
privatizing services previously provided by government. Given these
examples, one could reasonably expect the cost of providing education
to drop drastically after privatization. If privatization of education
reduces costs by 30%, local government could pay only $3,500 per
student, instead of $5,000. Reducing taxes would consequently be a real
possibility.
While vouchers would significantly improve the educational system
by breaking the government monopoly on education, reducing cost, and
enhancing the quality of education, they are only a half-way solution, a
form of market socialism. The basic issue still remains: by what right
does government force some people to pay for the education of other
people's children? Moreover, property rights are still being violated
because the money used to provide for vouchers comes from taxes-the
forcible taking of property without the owner's consent. Finally, with
a voucher system, the government would still be involved in education.
For instance, the possibility exists that, in order to be eligible to receive
vouchers, a school would have to comply with certain government
requirements. Such government involvement would defeat the whole
purpose of vouchers.
A better approach, from a human rights perspective, would be to
establish a user fee system through which parents pay for the education
288. The state of Vermont has used a voucher system for many years. See John McClaughry,
Who Says Vouchers Won't Work?, REASON, Jan. 1984, at 24, cited in Goodman, supra note 260,
at 124. As of 1984, 95 of Vermont's 246 towns did not have public schools and did not belong to
high school districts. Id. These local governments instead used vouchers to contract out the service
to private schools. Id.
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of their own children. In cases where parents are too poor to pay the
*full amount, perhaps a charitable organization or special government
fund could supply the necessary funding.
V. Principles of Taxation for Emerging Economies
Unlike Western democracies, which have entrenched tax systems
that lawmakers can change only piecemeal if at all, emerging economies
are not saddled with inalterable tax systems. Accordingly, they have the
rare opportunity to construct tax systems practically from scratch. They
can adopt systems that raise revenue without the burdens of excess
complexity and administrative cost and without the evils of coercion and
inequity. Based on the principles previously examined in detail,
emerging democracies should utilize the following general guideline in
constructing a system of revenue collection:
* Noncoercive methods should be used first, and coercive methods
should be utilized only as a last resort. In countries that do not need to
support a large defense force and that have privatized wherever possible,
there may be no need to resort to coercive forms of taxation. Lotteries
and user fees-the only forms of noncoercive taxation-will be sufficient
to raise the needed revenue. Aside from being equitable, these methods
do not distort incentives, and consequently, economic growth is not
stifled. Moreover, noncoercive taxation methods are the only tax
methods that do not violate property rights.
0 Where coercion is needed to raise the necessary revenue, some
taxes are better than others. Emerging economies should never resort to
a tax that is based on the ability to pay principle. Such forms of taxation
are inherently unfair because they are based on exploitation. Taxes
based on the cost-benefit principle at least have some degree of "rough
justice" because some relationship exists between what people pay and
what they receive in government benefits. Accordingly, a flat income
tax is preferable to a graduated income tax. Furthermore, governments
should impose a tax "cap," some maximum beyond which individuals are
not taxed. Based on the cost-benefit principle, it is difficult to justify
forcing an individual to pay $100 million in taxes because no individual
can possibly receive $100 million in government benefits. Perhaps
$10,000 or some other figure is more equitable.
0 Where an emerging economy uses coercive taxation, it should
keep rates as low as possible. Low rates are more equitable than high
rates because they confiscate the least amount of property from an
individual. In addition, low rates affect economic growth less negatively
and distort an economy to a lesser extent than high rates.
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* Emerging economies should adopt simple rather than complex
tax systems in order to reduce administrative costs. Emerging economies
should thus avoid emulating the tax systems in most Western
democracies because these systems are needlessly complex and cause
high administrative costs.
0 Governments should utilize visible rather than hidden taxes so
that taxpayers know what they pay for government services. Hidden
taxes are dishonest and akin to thievery. Government officials should
always keep in mind that they are elected to serve the public. Public
officials who hide the true cost of government from those who pay are
acting dishonestly, just as a bookkeeper who hides costs from an
employer is acting dishonestly.
* Where appropriate, emerging economies should earmark, rather
than pour taxes into a general fund because earmarking insures that tax
revenues are spent for their intended purposes.
0 Tax rules should be clear and easily understandable to the
average taxpayer. Vague tax rules cause unnecessary confusion, increase
administration costs, and generally increase disrespect for tax laws and
government.
* Emerging economies should avoid changing tax laws once they
are established. Frequent modification increases complexity and
resulting administrative costs, increases distortion to segments of an
economy, and retards economic growth. When lawmakers take the time
to construct a tax system based on sound tax principles, little or no need
for frequent change will exist.
* Emerging economies should only adopt tax systems that collect
more than they cost to administer. While seemingly obvious, many
Western democracies have yet to comprehend this basic point.
Lawmakers should immediately repeal any tax that collects less than the
costs of administration.
0 Tax laws should not continue indefinitely without the need for
reenactment, but should have a fixed life. Experience has shown that
passing a law is easier than repealing a law. Accordingly, a government
that passes laws that expire after a fixed period of time insures that bad
laws will be ultimately scrapped and will not remain in effect forever.
A country that adopts a tax system based on these principles will
enhance its economic growth and minimize inequity. Confiscation of
property violates basic human rights, and the tax systems advocated in
this paper eliminate or minimize the amount of confiscation that must
occur to raise the funds needed to pay for government services.

